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Background: Resource allocation decisions are made based on the principle of maximizing population 
health (efficiency). However, in practice, much higher willingness-to-pay thresholds are used for 
cancer therapies, with limited supportive evidence. 
 
Objective: To quantify Canadian public preferences on trade-offs between cancer and non-cancer 
health outcomes. 
 
Methods: Our systematic review identified 7 studies, but none evaluated cancer trade-offs. We 
conducted a survey using a sample of 300 respondents, with three resource allocation scenarios: (1) 
cancer versus non-cancer; (2) lung cancer versus heart failure; and (3) lung cancer prevention versus 
diabetes prevention.  
 
Results: The median respondent preferred health maximization, irrespective of the health condition. 
Across scenarios 1/2/3, only 29%, 10%, and 26%, respectively, were willing to trade-off efficiency to 
prioritize cancer outcomes. Regression analysis did not find any significant associations.  
 
Conclusion: We did not find evidence to support a higher preference for sacrificing total health to 














Summary for Lay Audience 
 
Resource allocation decisions made by our health system focus on the principle of maximizing total 
population health for the available resources. Policy makers determine whether a health intervention 
is worth funding if it is at what they consider an “acceptable threshold” of cost-effectiveness. 
However, in many countries, including Canada, cancer drug reimbursements are evaluated using 
higher cost-effectiveness thresholds than other interventions; this implies that cancer outcomes are 
valued higher than non-cancer outcomes. There is limited evidence that society supports this 
threshold and is willing to sacrifice a portion of the total population health in favour of certain health 
conditions. 
 
The objective of this thesis was first to conduct a systematic review to identify Canadian studies 
eliciting trade-offs between population groups. As we did not identify any studies evaluating cancer 
conditions, our second objective was to determine Canadians' relative preference on health gains 
associated with cancer versus non-cancer conditions - this was achieved through our survey. We 
invited participants to allocate additional treatment funds to patients with non-cancer health problems 
(option A) or patients with cancer (option B); however, option B became more and more inefficient 
with each subsequent comparison. This framework was used for three allocation scenarios: (1) cancer 
versus non-cancer; (2) lung cancer versus heart failure; and (3) lung cancer prevention versus diabetes 
prevention. The degree of preference was estimated by observing the point at which a respondent is 
indifferent between the two options or “switches” from option B (supports cancer patients) to option 
A (supports non-cancer patients). Responses were also categorized based on when the respondent 
makes the “switch” or becomes indifferent.  
 
We found that the median respondent preferred health maximization, irrespective of the health 
condition (60%-75%). Across scenarios 1/2/3, only 29%, 10%, and 26%, respectively, were willing to 
trade-off efficiency to prioritize cancer outcomes. 
 
We did not find evidence to support sacrificing a portion of the total population health to improve 
cancer outcomes. As societal preferences are crucial to healthcare priority-setting and can be used to 
inform decision-making processes, future research should focus on gaining a deeper understanding of 
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 1 Introduction 
The conventional economic evaluation approach used for resource allocation decisions 
focuses on efficiency, i.e., maximizing total health and minimizing total costs, irrespective of 
who gains and who loses from policy interventions. Policy makers determine whether a 
health intervention is worth funding if it is at what they consider an “acceptable threshold” of 
cost-effectiveness. However, in many countries, including Canada, certain drug 
reimbursements (i.e., cancer, rare disease drugs) are evaluated using higher cost-effectiveness 
thresholds than other interventions. This suggests that health gains in these conditions are 
valued higher than health gains in other conditions. Globally, literature has shown that 
individuals exhibit some preference for certain health conditions and sociodemographic 
groups in resource allocation decisions; however, more work on this topic in a Canadian 
context is needed [1]–[3]. Preferences of the general public are crucial for healthcare priority-
setting as taxpayers are the ones supporting this system. This is particularly true for scenarios 
where resources are scarce – the value that society places on a given treatment or patient 
group will help facilitate health policies that align with public preferences. Improving total 
population health and incorporating societal preferences are two essential objectives of health 
policy; for this reason, priority weighting involved in healthcare trade-off decisions need to 
be thoroughly assessed. The first objective of this study is to conduct a systematic review to 
identify Canadian studies eliciting trade-offs between population groups. Afterward, this 
study aims to elicit Canadian societal preferences for trade-offs between cancer and non-
cancer health outcomes through a questionnaire. 
 
This chapter will discuss economic evaluation methods used to aid policy makers in 
healthcare allocation decisions. It also covers issues and inconsistencies associated with these 
methods and how this may influence the value of a health gain when resources are scarce. 






1.1 Economic Evaluations for Healthcare Decisions 
1.1.1 Cost-Effectiveness Analysis and Other Methods 
In many countries, including Canada, the cost-effectiveness analysis (CEA) is a widely used 
method to aid policy makers in healthcare allocation decisions [4]. This method focuses on 
efficiency – maximizing total population health for the available amount of resources. A 
notable feature of the CEA is its ability to compare interventions with different health 
outcomes. The CEA commonly uses an effect measure of ‘utility’ – a universal health 
outcome [5]. This measure of utility ranges between 0 and 1, where 0 represents death, and 1 
is considered “perfect health.” This utility measure is usually expressed as quality-adjusted 
life-years (QALYs). The measure of QALYs represents the additional years of a ‘healthy’ 
life one would experience; a utility factor adjusts this value to dictate the quality of these life 
years [6]. When assessing a health intervention, policy makers use cost-effectiveness ratios to 
dictate the amount of financial investment required for an additional health gain compared to 
the current standard of care. This ratio is referred to as the incremental cost-effectiveness 
ratio (ICER). The numerator is expressed as the incremental cost in dollars expended to 
obtain a health outcome. The denominator is the incremental health gain represented as life 
years, QALYs, or another health metric [7]. Policy makers determine whether a health 
intervention is worth funding if the ICER for this intervention is at what they consider an 
“acceptable threshold” of cost-effectiveness [4]. This threshold represents the opportunity 
cost of implementing a new intervention. Opportunity cost can be described as the loss of 
potential gain from other options when one alternative is chosen – this is something decision-
makers discuss when weighing healthcare options.  
 
Another technique used by health economists is the cost-benefit analysis (CBA). This 
method uses monetary terms to describe the benefits and consequences of an intervention [5]. 
This method is advantageous when interventions do not present health outcomes in the same 
units. Although it is difficult to provide a monetary value for one’s life or a degree of pain 
relief, two techniques estimate this value. The first approach is based on the individual’s 




earnings [5]. The second approach relies on the Willingness-to-Pay (WTP) concept – how 
much an individual is willing to pay for a specific health state, such as eliminating a certain 
disease, reducing symptoms, etc. Although the CBA is one of the most comprehensive 
economic evaluations available, it has a few limitations. One example is using the WTP 
framework in a society that is not used to paying for healthcare [5]. Finally, a relatively 
uncommon but helpful technique is the cost-minimization analysis. This type of analysis 
determines the lowest costing program when the interventions under consideration have 
identical health outcomes.  
 
Each method mentioned has its advantages and disadvantages in varying scenarios. As 
previously mentioned, the CEA has become the preferred technique for healthcare 
evaluations across many countries; however, the CEA has a significant limitation which has 
recently resulted in the development of a new model. Unfortunately, the CEA ignores 
existing differences in the baseline distribution of health between social groups and 
differences in ‘capacity to benefit’ from health programs.  This is problematic as resource 
allocation formulae that ignore this baseline distribution and potential difference in the gains 
made by each group are likely to continue the level of health disparities (in the best-case 
scenario) or exacerbate health disparities (in the worst case). A more equitable analysis and 
one that should become more widely used in resource allocation decisions is the 
distributional cost-effective analysis (DCEA) – which is also an extension of the CEA [8]. 
 
The DCEA framework estimates the baseline or current social distributions of health and 
models the changes in said health based on the healthcare interventions being compared [8]. 
Several important parameters can be gathered from a DCEA, specifically, the absolute and 
relative inequality (or disparities) indices. These values are a form of societal preference 
weights. Note, health “disparities” and “inequalities” are similar terms but yet distinct 
concepts; disparity implies a general “difference” whereas inequality implies a “state of 
being unfair [9].” The Atkinson index and Kolm index are common measures obtained from 
a DCEA and can be used to assess health distributions in terms of relative and absolute 
income inequality, respectively [10], [11]. These inequality indices represent the level of 
inequality aversion across health interventions in terms of income and can be used to 




regard to health can be described as the amount of total population health that someone is 
willing to sacrifice to obtain a more equal distribution of health. Inequality aversion indices 
can describe many domains, as stated earlier, with income and health being two of them. 
However, it can also describe inequality aversion in terms of age, disease severity or rarity, 
etc.  
 
The Atkinson parameter and other preference weights can also be determined through 
societal preference surveys, which focus on trade-off scenarios and resource allocation 
decisions. These types of studies usually require participants to choose between health 
maximization (efficiency) or the prioritization of disadvantaged groups without directly 
asking them. Alongside the economic models mentioned, these preference estimates can be 
used as a secondary source to guide policy makers. It is crucial for decision makers to 
recognize where society stands on trade-off allocation decisions – after all, the optimal 
healthcare policy should highly depend on the attitudes of its citizens [12]. 
 
1.1.1.2 Preference Elicitation 
Fixed budgets within healthcare systems and the obligation to efficiently allocate resources 
necessitate the economic evaluation of health interventions [13]. This allows economists to 
determine the true value of a good. However, what if taxpayers, the ones supporting this 
system, value other social goals than just pure economic efficiency? Stated preference 
techniques are tools that can help inform decision makers to properly allocate resources 
according to what society prioritizes – whether it be certain health conditions or 
sociodemographic groups.  
 
A choice experiment is a quantitative method commonly used in healthcare to elicit 
preferences from participants. These experiments allow researchers to determine someone’s 
preference without directly asking them through hypothetical scenarios. Choice experiments 
allow researchers to evaluate preferences in a controlled setting while avoiding potential 
confounding biases [13]. In these hypothetical scenarios, a researcher will present various 
combinations of available features for a good or service and ask the participant which version 




much an individual is willing to pay or “give up” (in trade-off scenarios) to acquire said 
good. Trade-off scenarios are a type of choice experiment for preference elicitation; here, a 
hypothetical decision will involve sacrificing one good to obtain a different good. Health 
economists commonly deal with equity-efficiency trade-offs when allocating scarce 
resources. Elicitation of society’s preferences can help inform and ease these types of trade-
off decisions.   
 
1.1.2   Quality-Adjusted Life Year and Other Utility Measures 
The QALY has established itself as the recommended outcome measure many academics and 
healthcare officials use to evaluate new interventions [4], [14]. The QALY considers both 
morbidity (quality) and mortality (survival) into one standardized metric; the QALY is 
calculated by multiplying the time in each health state by its utility [14]. The creation of the 
QALY is based on the concept that individuals move through different health states over 
time, and each health state has a value assigned to it [15]. As previously indicated, the QALY 
ranges from 0 (death) to 1 (perfect health); however, it is possible for a health state worse 
than death to occur, which is presented as a negative value. In economic evaluations, the 
concept of QALYs is based on the thought that one health state is more desirable or more 
valuable than another [14]. However, this is very subjective, “more valuable” to whom? 
 
Among elicitation methods in populations, there are probabilistic and non-probabilistic 
measures to determine the desirability of a health state. The first non-probabilistic measure is 
a rating scale; individuals’ value how they would feel in a given health state on a linear scale 
of 0 (death) to 100 (full health). This estimate is commonly captured in preference-stated 
surveys [16]. This method can also be used to assess the health of a community. In this case, 
individuals are not conceptualizing the value of a health state concerning their health, but 
rather the health state of a group of people. This value can be estimated through person trade-
off studies [15].  
 
Common probabilistic techniques used to value health states are the standard gamble and 
time trade-off  [17]. The standard gamble evaluates preferences under conditions of 




life expectancy in a given health state or the probability of living with the best possible 
outcome (p) as well as the probability of living with the worst possible outcome (1-p) [18]. 
These probabilities are varied until the subject is indifferent. Similarly, the time trade-off 
method requires a subject to sacrifice a variable amount of life to avoid a health state [19].  
For example, would a patient choose to live 20 years with asthma or 15 years without 
asthma? The risk of death is varied until a patient is indifferent to the choices. Unfortunately, 
the use of the rating scale, standard gamble, and time trade-off elicitation methods do not 
yield identical utility values [17]. 
 
Aside from the varying utility values caused by elicitation methods, the conventional QALY 
also lacks concerns for health disparities. Specifically, the conventional QALY disregards an 
individual’s pre-treatment utility level. This value is important as both societal preferences, 
and ethical theory suggest that the worse off an individual is without an intervention, the 
society tends to value this intervention more highly [17]. Secondly, this model naturally 
favours individuals with more treatable conditions, hence, those with the greatest potential to 
benefit from an intervention [17]. This contradicts ethical theory as individuals should not be 
discriminated against because of their remaining lifetime or because their health condition 
does not have a complete cure [20]. An exaggerated example of the second issue is that the 
QALY prioritizes life-years gained by preventing fatal accidents in otherwise “healthy” 
people over gains in the quality of life of an individual with a chronic illness or disability 
[17]. This, once again, contradicts the concept of protecting all life regardless of an 
individual’s health state. 
 
There are many ethical concerns with the use of QALYs, which leads to an important 
question, should all QALYs be considered equal? As previously mentioned, the nature of a 
QALY favours certain conditions, yet traditional economic evaluations assume “a QALY is a 
QALY.” This rationale does not entirely align with societal preferences. Some QALYs are 
considered more valuable than others, such as the life years of younger patients or those with 
high-priority diseases [21]. Tsuchiya et al. describe three types of reasoning for age-related 
preferences, the first favour younger patients over the elderly due to their longer life 
expectancies. The second favour young adults over children as they are productive members 




of life  [22], [23]. Many other experts also argue for younger patients to be prioritized in 
allocation decisions due to the ‘fair innings’ argument (FIA), which is implied in Tsuchiya’s 
third reasoning. The FIA claims healthcare resources should be distributed fairly, so every 
person has the same opportunity to live to a certain life expectancy. Consequently, older 
individuals have already lived a ‘good portion’ of their life; thus, the FIA implies resources 
should be directed to the young, as it would be fairer and more “worthwhile [23].” 
Unfortunately, the FIA is often used as an excuse to deny the elderly treatment, which 
contradicts ethical theory – without knowing an individual's life history, who has the right to 
determine that someone has lived a “long enough” life?  
 
Aside from age-related preferences, there are many other patient characteristics that society 
seems to value differently. For instance, was the cause of a health condition the “fault” of the 
patient, or was it caused by factors out of the individual’s control? A notable example is 
patients who develop lung cancer. Some may believe these individuals deserve less priority 
in resource allocation decisions as they developed the disease due to their lifestyle choices, 
such as smoking. However, it is just as plausible that these patients were exposed to lung 
cancer risk factors through their employment. Recently, there has been much discussion 
surrounding the worth of a QALY and whether certain traits in an individual should decrease 
or increase their QALY value, few more examples include the number of dependents an 
individual has, their socioeconomic status, disease rarity, and severity [23]. Labelle and 
Hurley proposed that a QALY should be worth more than 1.0 if society values health 
improvements in a specific group of individuals more highly [24].  
 
Although the QALY is a powerful tool used to aid policy makers in allocation decisions, a 
few inconsistencies limit the use of this metric. As previously mentioned, the QALY focuses 
on health maximization and naturally prioritizes specific groups due to its underlying 
theoretical assumptions. For instance, a life-saving drug for children is more likely to be cost-
effective than a life-saving drug for the elderly, as the former would yield higher QALYs. 
Secondly, the QALY does not consider the value society associates with specific patient 
groups. As Labelle and Hurley proposed, a QALY should be weighted more if there is an 
explicit preference or societal concern for particular patient groups. For instance, society may 




or those with cancer versus non-cancer conditions. In these situations, society may want to 
associate higher value to health gains in these disadvantaged groups – this is the type of 
preference this study aims to elicit. What is considered “fair” is an open question and should 
be based on societal preferences to inform resource allocation decisions. 
 
It is worth mentioning that a few alternatives to the QALY exist. The most common include 
the disability-adjusted life year (DALY) and WTP. The DALY measures the burden of a 
disease through the years lost due to premature mortality as well as the years of life lost due 
to the time lived in less than full health states [25]. The WTP measures health benefits 
through monetary terms; it directly asks people the maximum amount of money they are 
willing to pay to eradicate a health condition or symptom. The WTP concept will be covered 
in more detail in section 1.1.3. 
 
1.1.2.1     A QALY is a QALY, or is it? 
The question of whether all QALYs should be treated equally has been debated in the 
literature. This is based on the idea that treating all QALYs the same would create health 
disparities or exacerbate existing disparities. Examples include disparities between 
socioeconomic, ethno-racial, or sex/gender-based groups, age groups, or disease conditions.  
For instance, individuals of a higher socioeconomic status tend to have a longer life 
expectancy of at least 10 years compared to their working-class counterparts [26]. There are 
many causes to these disparities – spatially, individuals are divided into nations with different 
demographic and geographical characteristics, biologically, there are phenotypical and 
cultural variations, and historical processes such as the development of wealth or social 
constructs have also facilitated differences across groups [27]. These divisions have been 
made apparent in healthcare through the unequal distribution of a health condition across a 
group, in the level of health risks, and in terms of differential access to healthcare resources 
[27]. Situations where mortality rates or other relevant health measures differ between 
region, disease status, social groups, and occupational class are examples of systematic 
health disparities.  
   




and proposed several changes to its procedures for the economic evaluation of health 
interventions [28]. Several of these changes include assigning greater weight to QALYs for 
patients in later stages of terminal diseases, increasing the cost-effectiveness WTP threshold 
for very rare diseases, and lowering the discount rate for health gains acquired from 
treatment which are said to be “substantial in restoring health and sustained over a very long 
period of time [28].” Although these changes aim to reduce health disparities, NICE has not 
considered how these new methods will impact the health of all their patients. Since NICE 
now recommends health interventions with significantly higher ICERs, the scale of loss of 
total health gain will be severe due to NICE’s fixed budget. For example, a QALY gained in 
a very rare disease patient will be expected to displace 20 QALYs in regular patients [28]. 
NICE seems to consider this recommendation appropriate since the QALY gained is by a 
group of patients whom NICE considers a higher priority. Unfortunately, the burden caused 
by this change will be placed on other patients with similar characteristics. Here, NICE is 
violating the principle of horizontal equity as patients with similar features will not benefit 
from these new technologies [28]. 
 
It seems that NICE is attaching special value to interventions that target severe health 
conditions and patient groups with a low capacity to benefit. Patients suffering from rare 
diseases have less “capacity to benefit” from treatment than non-rare disease patients, 
especially when the treatment does not cure the disease [29]. This is unfortunately due to the 
rare disease’s severity, and it’s impact on life expectancy. Using the QALY rule would imply 
that healthcare investments should go towards conditions for which patients have the highest 
capacity to benefit. Consequently, this could lead to an increase in disparities between health 
conditions or patient groups. The changes proposed by NICE may be a means to counteract 
the natural assumptions of the QALY. 
 
1.1.3  The Willingness-to-Pay Threshold 
The willingness-to-pay threshold represents the maximum amount of money an individual is 
willing to pay for a given service, such as eliminating a health condition or symptom. This 
threshold represents the opportunity cost of implementing a new intervention, which is 
frequently presented as dollars ($) per QALY.  Policy makers determine whether a health 




effectiveness [4]. Recently, there has been much debate over the use of these thresholds as 
they range greatly across countries based on the assumptions and methods used [30].  
 
The Canadian Agency for Drugs and Technologies in Health (CADTH) generally uses a 
cost-effective threshold of $50,000 (CAD) per QALY as a guideline [31]. Similarly, the 
NICE uses a benchmark of £20,000-30,000 per QALY [32]. The WHO suggests a threshold 
of 1-3x the gross domestic product per capita, and most national cost-effectiveness thresholds 
fall into this range; however, there are exceptions [33]. In Thailand, thresholds can be as little 
as $4400 (USD) per QALY, and in Norway, as high as $174,000 (USD) per QALY [33]. 
Recently, in North America, a threshold of $150,000-$200,000 (CAD) per QALY has been 
used for rare disease medications [34]. Interventions which are 3x the gross domestic product 
per capita (i.e., $150,000 USD) are usually deemed economically unattractive, whereas 
interventions with high ICER values (i.e., <$50,000 USD) are favourable and cost-effective 
[35]. Interventions approved under high cost-effective thresholds (i.e., >$150,000 USD) are 
generally for rare conditions that lack sufficient treatment, such as cancer. A study 
comparing the cost-effectiveness of cancer drugs in the UK and US determined that seven 
drugs were not cost-effective out of 11 commonly assessed cancer drugs [36]. Similarly, a 
study assessing the cost-effectiveness of 35 orphan drugs found that only three drugs met the 
WTP threshold of $150,000-$200,000 (CAD), and none met the threshold of $50,000 (CAD) 
[34]. The range of WTP thresholds used implies that certain QALYs are more valuable than 
others as the cost of an additional health gain in a rare disease patient is essentially 3x the 
price of a health gain in another patient group. 
 
Many health economists argue that the “rarity” of a disease should not be considered in 
reimbursement decisions [37]. Additionally, orphan drugs should not be evaluated differently 
than common disease drugs as this would be sacrificing overall health to allow for the 
availability of rare disease therapies [38]. However, in practice, this would result in 
reimbursement refusal for many orphan drugs [39]. On the contrary, other economists believe 
the lack of effective therapies and the severity of the health condition are valid reasons to 
depart from the standard value for money criteria [37]. Regardless, the commercial 
development of rare disease drugs is challenging as low disease prevalence makes it difficult 




in turn, leads to high research and development costs, and thus, higher drug acquisition costs, 
which often make the drug appear less favorable to payers [34]. For this reason, many 
countries have adopted specialized processes to review these types of interventions. These 
evaluations tend to consider the severity of the disease and the unmet needs of rare disease 
patients [34]. 
 
1.1.4  Reimbursement Decisions in Canada 
Canada’s healthcare system is mostly publicly funded. Some consider it “free” in the sense 
that citizens can obtain a healthcare service from a hospital or physician’s clinic without 
leaving with a bill [40]. However, the revenue obtained to support these healthcare services 
comes from Canadian taxpayers. The federal government provides each province with 
funding to deliver healthcare services. In turn, the provincial government implements these 
healthcare services while following The Canada Health Act. The Canada Health Act 
specifies the minimum conditions or services that a province must implement in order to 
keep their federal funding; for instance, provinces must provide coverage for essential 
physician visits [40]. The provincial government is also responsible for the development and 
administration of healthcare insurance plans which are unique to their region. These 
individual insurance plans may provide additional benefits for certain healthcare services or 
prescription drugs, which will be listed on the public formulary. The public healthcare 
system covers drugs administered in a hospital setting; however, drugs prescribed outside of 
a hospital setting can either be covered by the public healthcare system, a private insurance 
company or paid for “out of pocket” by the individual [40]. Each province holds a list of 
drugs and conditions (e.g., individuals who are 65+ years) that the public healthcare plan can 
cover. Since the public drug plan for services administered outside a hospital setting is very 
limited, citizens will often obtain a private drug plan to cover more of their drug expenses. 
Typically, employers will provide their workers with group help benefits from a plan they 
purchased from a private insurance [40]. 
  
To list a new drug to the public formulary, the provincial government must enter an 
independent agreement with the drug manufacturers. This product listing agreement typically 
covers volume discounts and cost containment measures such as patient and market caps 




having multiple parallel negotiations for the same drug product. As a result, the Canadian 
Agency of Drugs and Technologies in Health (CADTH) was created as a single source for 
review, analysis, and drug/technologies recommendations. Under the Common Drug Review 
(CDR) initiative, common drugs Health Canada has approved are analyzed by CADTH to 
determine whether they are cost-effective; if deemed so, CADTH will recommend their use 
[40]. Similarly, the pan-Canadian Oncology Drug Review (pCODR) was established and 
later transferred to CADTH to provide review of oncology drugs [41]. Overall, CADTH 
provides each province, except Quebec, with a unique drug listing and reimbursement 
recommendations for both common and oncology drugs. The Institut National d’Excellence 
en Santé et en Services Sociaux (INESSS) manages the review and drug recommendations 
for Quebec [40]. Both the INESSS and CADTH provide guidelines for Canada’s provinces; 
however, the Ministry of Health is not required to follow them.  
 
To simplify and accelerate drug negotiations across provinces, the pan-Canadian 
Pharmaceutical Alliance (PCPA) was established to undergo the first round of negotiations 
on behalf of participating provinces [40], [42]. The PCPA would present a ‘Letter of Intent’ 
to the drug manufacturers of interest, presenting the cost public payers are willing to pay for 
said drug and may also include other restrictions and rights [42]. Public (i.e., provincial) drug 
plans may use this letter as a basis for subsequent negotiations; however, it is important to 
note that private drug plans do not participate with the PCPA [40].  Private drug plans have 
become increasingly more common over the last decade. Its popularity could be partially 
attributable to its extensive coverage of rare and specialty diseases (i.e., orphan drugs and 
biologics). To ensure the prices of patented drugs are not excessive, the Patented Medicine 
Prices Review Board (PMPRB) exists to protect and inform Canadian consumers [40]. The 
PMPRB also reports pricing trends in the pharmaceutical industry through Annual Reports.  
 
Public reimbursement of most drugs varies significantly across the country; however, this is 
especially true for cancer treatment. For instance, in British Columbia, Alberta, 
Saskatchewan, Manitoba, and Quebec, oral chemotherapy drugs are fully covered under the 
provincial drug formulary; however, in Ontario, New Brunswick, Prince Edward Island, 
Nova Scotia, Newfoundland, and Labrador, this is not the case [41]. Intravenous 




reimbursement recommendations, not all provinces implement these recommendations due to 
their differing decision criteria, which leads to a large disparity in the accessibility of cancer 
drugs across provinces. Provinces that list cancer drugs on the public formulary also include 
eligibility criteria; this further exacerbates provincial variability in treatment accessibility as 
certain citizens may not meet the specific requirements for provincial coverage [41]. The 
disproportionate public coverage of oral cancer drugs can lead to disparities within and 
across provinces. Astonishingly, two Canadians with cancer can have two very different 
experiences when acquiring their treatment. For instance, if one Canadian lives in a province 
where oral chemotherapy is on the provincial formulary, they will obtain this drug for free, 
whereas the other individual will not. The second individual, living in a province where oral 
chemotherapy is not funded, will attempt to receive coverage through other means such as 
private insurance companies. However, if an individual does not have private insurance, they 
will then attempt to qualify for other programs; for instance, in Ontario, coverage options 
include the Ontario Drug Benefit Program or the Trillium Drug Program [41]. Even then, if a 
patient is eligible for the Trillium Drug Program, they will have to make copayments of 
approximately 4% of their total household income before the oral chemotherapy drugs are 
covered. One may assume that most cancer patients receive intravenous chemotherapy 
(which is fully funded); however, this is not the case. Data from 2016 has shown that 48% of 
cancer treatment is administered orally [41]. Thus, a majority of Ontario citizens (and 
citizens of other provinces who do not fund oral chemotherapies) will have to face the burden 
of these expenses. Depending on the scenario, oral chemotherapy pills can range anywhere 
from $1,800 to $132,000 (CAD) per year [41]. This example shows the inter- and intra-
provincial disparities caused by the varying drug coverage across Canada; this could be 
prevented if a national pharmacare program was established.  
 
1.2  Study Objectives 
 In terms of resource allocation decisions, they should reflect public and patient priorities. 
The current economic evaluations used in healthcare decisions are inconsistent and may not 
accurately reflect how the general population believes funding should be spent. Additionally, 
these methods may exacerbate health disparities that exist across social groups. There is no 




decisions in the Canadian population. Specifically, there is a lack of Canadian literature on 
the societal preferences of trade-offs involving cancer versus non-cancer conditions in 
allocation decisions. The two main objectives of this thesis are: 
1) To systematically review the Canadian evidence on public preferences in relation to 
trade-offs involved in resource allocation between health conditions and 
sociodemographic groups.  
 
2) To elicit preferences of the Canadian general public on resource allocation involving 
trade-offs between cancer and non-cancer health gains. Additionally, to determine if 
preferences vary by demographic factors or the respondent’s relationship to a cancer 
patient. 
 
1.3  Thesis Overview 
The next chapter contains a systematic review of the available literature regarding the 
Canadian population’s preferences on resource allocation decisions. Chapter 3 will discuss 
the process and considerations of creating our trade-off questionnaire. Chapter 4 and chapter 
5 will then cover the methodology and results of the questionnaire. Lastly, chapter 6 will 
discuss the results of our systematic review and survey, as well as its place in the current 
















2  Systematic Review Introduction 
This chapter contains a systematic review of the available evidence on societal preferences in 
Canada regarding trade-offs involved in resource allocation decisions. It will summarize the 
search and screening process of the captured studies as well as the results. This chapter also 
covers a discussion and conclusion of the results. 
 
2.1  Search Strategy, Eligibility, and Output 
On June 30th 2020, three electronic databases were searched: Ovid EMBASE (607), Ovid 
MEDLINE (493), and EBSCO EconLit (291). The search strategy was based on the 
following key concepts: health disparities, societal preferences, and decision trade-offs. 
McNamara et al., review of trade-off studies in the UK was used as a reference [1]. The first 
draft of the search strategy was tested in the EMBASE database. The search had no time 
restrictions. Appendix A provides the complete and final search syntax. In addition to 
searching the databases, the reference lists of relevant papers were also scanned to detect any 
other suitable studies. 
 
Two separate reviewers screened all titles and abstracts identified in the search. Studies that 
did not focus on healthcare trade-offs were deemed irrelevant and removed. Two independent 
reviewers also performed full-text screening. Studies were included in the systematic review 
if they met the following inclusion criteria. First, studies that sampled Canadians were 
included. Second, survey studies that required participants to make decisions about resource 
allocation or answer hypothetical scenarios based on redistribution of lifetime health were 
included. Theses and dissertations were included if the primary criteria were met. 
Disagreements between the two reviewers were settled in discussion with a third reviewer. 
After removing duplicates, the abstracts, and titles of 839 unique studies were screened. Of 
these, 751 studies were removed as they were deemed irrelevant (e.g., ethical debates, 
narrative reviews, etc.). A total of 88 studies underwent full-text screening, resulting in 7 




reason for exclusion was the sample population; many studies did not take place in Canada. 
The rationale and breakdown of studies removed are described in the PRISMA flowchart 
(Figure 1). Two independent reviewers completed data extraction. 
 
 





2.2  Study Characteristics 
2.2.1  Participants 
Of the seven studies identified, the majority used national samples [2], [3], [43], [46] while 
the remainder used provincial samples [12], [44], [45]. The sample size of the selected 
studies ranged from 32 participants [45] to 2009 participants [12]. The most common method 
of participant recruitment was letters sent through the post or emails sent to a random sample 
of residents. During recruitment, six of the studies performed age-sex stratification to ensure 
their sample characteristics were representative of the Canadian population [2], [3], [12], 
[43], [45], [46]. One study also stratified their sample by region [3], and another study 
stratified by income and education level on top of the age-sex stratification [45]. Further 






















1964 Ontario Letters were sent in the post to 
community-dwelling adults. 
Recruitment in the study is based 
on age-sex stratification. 
 
Online  Cross-sectional study  Single LE and 
Income 
Johri et al. 
(2008) 
2009 Pan-Canadian Emails were sent to residents who 
were part of an existing online 
panel. Recruitment in the study is 
based on age-sex stratification. 
 
Online Experimental study  
- Half of the respondents were randomly 
assigned to receive a moral reasoning 
exercise after reading the choice scenario 
(intervention)  








et al. (1997) 
80 Ontario Senior officials in the Ontario 
Ministry of Health (MHO) were 
contacted through the post. 
Recruitment in the study focused on 
the top 135 MHO officials. 
 
Postal Cross-sectional study  Single LE, NT, and 
gain in LE 
Denburg et 
al. (2020) 
1556 Pan-Canadian Emails were sent to a random 
sample of residents who were part 
of an existing online panel. 
Recruitment in the study is based 
on age-sex and region stratification. 
Online Experimental study  
- Half of the respondents were randomly 
assigned to receive a moral reasoning 
exercise prior to each choice scenario 
(intervention) 









Residents in Calgary and Edmonton 
were invited to participate by letters 
sent through the post. Recruitment 
in the study is based on age-sex, 
region, education level, and 




Longitudinal study  Repeated 
the same 
day  
LE, NT, and 













Two groups were included in this 
survey:  
(1) A sample drawn from an 
existing online research panel. 
(2) A sample of decision-making 
agents invited to participate by 
emails and flyers. 
Recruitment in the study for sample 
(1) was based on age-sex 
stratification. 
 
Online Cross-sectional study  Single LE, NT and 
gain LE 
Dragojlovic 
et al. (2015) 
2005 Pan-Canadian Canadians aged 19 years and over 
were recruited through a research 
company (IPSOS Reid Canada). 
The mode of recruitment 
communication was not mentioned.  
Online Experimental study 
- Half of the respondents were randomly 
assigned to one of two versions of the 
study (‘Extra Funds’ vs. ‘Existing Funds’ 
versions)  
- The Extra Funds version involved the 
allocation of new funds received from the 
MHO 
- The Existing Funds version involved the 
allocation of current dollars  
Single  NT 









2.2.2  Study Design and Methods 
All studies focused on trade-off scenarios where the respondents were required to allocate 
resources to different populations. One study focused on allocating resources to poor versus 
rich individuals [12], two studies looked at age-related resource allocations [3], [43] and one 
orphan drug study required allocation of resources to patients with rare or common diseases 
[2]. The remaining three studies had allocation situations where populations differed in 
several factors such as disease severity, age, and the number of individuals treated [44]–[46]. 
One study provided an inequality aversion estimate in terms of income and health 
distributions [12], whereas the remaining studies measured trade-offs through mean 
preference scores [3], [43], percentage of individuals favoring a given program/scenario [2], 
[44], compensating variation [46] and rate of agreement between respondent groups [45].  
 
Five of the seven studies administered their questionnaire online [2], [3], [12], [43], [46], one 
study had a paper-based questionnaire sent through the post [44], and the last study used an 
in-person discussion method [45]. Five studies were single questionnaires [2], [3], [12], [44], 
[46] and the remainder used repeated questionnaires [43], [45]. Of the repeated 
questionnaires, one was repeated the same day [45] whereas the other was repeated after 
seven weeks [43]. Two studies were experimental studies in which the researchers randomly 
distributed a moral reasoning exercise to half of the respondents, known as the intervention 
group. One study had the respondents complete this exercise before each scenario was 
introduced, while the other study had respondents complete this exercise after reading each 
scenario description [3], [43]. A third experimental study on orphan drugs randomly assigned 
participants to two different versions of the questionnaire; here, framing effects were 
presented differently [2]. The remainder of the studies were cross-sectional or longitudinal 
studies where no manipulations by the researchers took place [12], [44]–[46].  
  
2.2.2.1  Survey Scenarios 
Hurley et al. measured disparities in terms of health and income. The questionnaire was 
separated into three parts in which the distributional scenarios focused on health, income, or 




government implement in a hypothetical country. Participants were essentially invited to 
allocate additional gains in health and income to either rich or poor individuals. Policy A was 
more equitable, as the distribution of health/income had a lower mean and variance. In 
contrast, policy B reflected health maximization as the distribution of health/income had a 
higher mean and variance. The range of health was presented as life expectancy varying 
between 55 years to 88 years, while income was presented in dollars varying between 
$12,200 to $168,500. Participants had the opportunity to provide reasoning on their policy 
selection [12]. 
 
Johri et al., and Denburg et al., had similar scenarios in their questionnaire; both studies 
measured age-related preferences. Johri et al. invited participants to choose between two 
hypothetical health programs to fund. The programs were identical except for the patient’s 
average age (35 years versus 65 years). The hypothetical programs included were either life-
saving, depression treatment, or palliative care. Denburg et al. invited participants to decide 
between two treatments they would fund from the perspective of a citizen advisor to a health 
system administrator. One drug treated the child (average age 10 years) form of the disease 
while the other treated the adult (average age 40 years) form of the disease. The five 
hypothetical treatments included chronic blood disease, liver transplant, cancer therapy, 
palliative care, and eating disorders. With drug treatment, both child and adult can be 
expected to live for about 20 years from diagnosis. Without treatment, patients die of the 
disease within six months of diagnosis. Both studies had half of the respondents complete a 
moral reasoning exercise. Johri et al. presented the exercise after the budget allocation 
scenario was introduced, whereas Denburg et al. presented the exercise before each scenario. 
Both studies invited participants to select allocation principles that guided their decision [3], 
[43]. 
 
Choudhry et al. also evaluated age-related preferences as well as the distribution of health 
gains, i.e., allocating large amounts of health gains to a few individuals vs. allocating a small 
amount of health gains to many individuals. Participants were asked to allocate a fixed sum 
of money to only one of program A or program B. The six hypothetical scenarios varied in 
the number of people affected each year by a given disease, average survival benefit from a 




patients. The number of hypothetical people affected each year ranged from 500 to 10,000. 
The average survival benefit ranged from 1 year to 20 years of life expectancy. The average 
age of hypothetical patients was 30 years vs. 50 years, and 5 years vs. 65 years. There were 
two control scenarios, two distribution of benefits scenarios, and two age effects scenarios 
[44].  
 
Stafinski et al. evaluated trade-offs in health gains associated with two general populations. 
Participants were assigned to discussion groups of 16 individuals, in which they were asked 
which technology to fund – one benefitting population A and one benefitting population B. 
The two populations differed in up to four of the following characteristics: age, current health 
state, health outcome (with technology), prognosis (without the technology), dependents, and 
the number of patients who would benefit. Average age ranged from young (20-30 years) to 
old (60-70 years). The current health state was presented as severely ill, moderately ill, or 
mildly ill. Health outcome was presented as full functioning, sufficient functioning, 
insufficient functioning. The prognosis was presented as a life expectancy of either a few 
weeks or 2-5 years. Having any dependents was displayed as either yes or no, and the 
number of patients who could benefit was either many or few. Participants in each discussion 
group had to reach a consensus and provide their reasoning for their decision [45].  
 
Skedgel et al. evaluated trade-offs in health gains between two populations of cancer 
patients. The participants were told that patient groups had different forms of cancer, but 
specific diagnoses were not mentioned. Participants were invited to allocate a fixed budget 
between two healthcare programs, program A or program B. Each program had a brief 
description of different attributes and levels that varied across each scenario (attributes: age, 
initial utility, initial life expectancy, final utility, gain in life expectancy, number of patients 
treated). Each attribute had three levels, age ranging from 10 years (level 1), 40 years (level 
2), to 70 years (level 3). The initial and final utility were presented as 1/10 (level 1), 5/10 
(level 2), and 9/10 (level 3). The initial life expectancy and gain in life expectancy were 
presented in years as 1 (level 1), 5 (level 2), and 10 (level 3). Lastly, patients treated were 





Lastly, Dragojlovic et al. measured trade-offs in health gains between patients with common 
diseases and those with rare diseases. Participants were randomized into two groups where 
the scenarios were framed differently: the “Extra Funds” group involved the allocation of 
new funds received from the provincial Ministry of Health and the “Existing Funds” group, 
which involved the allocation of current dollars. The “Existing Fund” group explicitly 
mentioned that treating one group of patients would involve withdrawing or withholding 
treatment from the other group. The two experimental groups were invited to allocate funds 
for two scenarios. The first scenario presented the cost of common and rare disease patients 
as equal (100 patients suffering from a rare disease or 100 patients suffering from a common 
disease), and the other presented the costs as unequal (100 patients suffering from a rare 
disease or 400 patients suffering from a common disease). A summary of the study designs 
and methods can be found in Table 2. 
 
2.2.3    Quality of Studies 
The quality of studies was assessed as low, medium, or high using the “Risk of Bias 
Instrument for Cross-Sectional Surveys of Attitudes and Practices” contributed by the 
CLARITY Group at McMaster University [47]. Overall, the identified studies were 
representative of the general Canadian provincial or local population except for one study. 
This sample population included only seniors who were more educated than the general 
public [44]. The level of missing data varied across studies; one study did not present this 
value [2], three studies had a high/medium level of missing data [3], [43], [44] and the 
remainder had a low level of missing data - less than 15% [12], [45], [46]. The survey 
response rate was only reported in four studies and varied from medium to low adequacy [3], 
[12], [43], [44]. Regarding the reliability of the survey instrument, the majority of studies 
pilot tested their questionnaires prior to the study or referred to a previous systematic review 
to identify important concepts. Therefore, the reliability of the survey instruments was 
considered high overall. There seem to be some bias concerns in the identified studies 
relating to the large amounts of missing data and the generally low response rate. For more 




Table 2: Study Design. 
Authors 
(date) 
Focus of Relevant 
Questions in the Study 
Range of Relevant 
Trade-Off 
 
Description of Survey Scenario  Were Participants Asked to 
Choose an Allocation Principle? 
Hurley et al. 
(2020) 
- Trade-off between 
allocating health gains to 
rich versus poor individuals 
 
- Trade-off between 
allocating additional 










- Participants were asked to decide which policy they prefer 
- Policy A is more equitable, whereas policy B reflects health 
maximization 
- Distributional scenarios focused on either health, income, or 
income-related health 
Yes – Most (90%) participants 
provided reasoning for choosing 
one policy over the other. The most 
common rationales were concerns 
for inequality and the worst-off. 
The other rationales included the 
opportunity for higher outcomes 
and higher mean. 
 
 
Johri et al. 
(2008) 
- Trade-off between 
allocating health gains to 
younger versus older 
patients through life-saving 
programs 
LE: 35 vs. 65 years - Participants were asked to decide between two hypothetical health 
programs to fund 
- Scenarios were identical except for the patient’s average age  
- Programs were either lifesaving, depression treatment, or 
palliative care 
- Half of the respondents completed a moral reasoning exercise 
after the allocation scenario was introduced  
Yes – participants were invited to 
select 3 of 10 possible allocation 
principles they deemed most 
important for the scenario under 
study. Allocation principles 
considered were:  
- Equal treatment  
- Patient need 
- Relief from suffering 
- Capacity to benefit/best outcomes  
- Maximise number helped  
- Family responsibilities 
- Guarantee chance for “full life” 
- Duration of benefit 
- Personal responsibility for health 





- Trade-off between 
allocating health gains to 
younger versus older 
patients  
 
- Trade-off between 
LE: 30 vs. 50 years,  
5 vs. 65 years 
 
NT: 500 to 10,000 
 
- Participants were asked to decide between two programs to fund  
- Hypothetical survey scenarios varied in the number of people 
affected, average survival benefit, side-effects/harms, and the 
average age of patients 
- Scenarios focused on the distribution of benefits and age effects 
  
No – there was no indication that 
participants had to explain their 





allocating a large amount of 
health gains to a few 
individuals vs. allocating a 
small amount of health 
gains to many individuals 
  




- Trade-off between 
allocating health gains to 
children vs. adults through 
life-saving programs 
LE: 10 vs. 40 years - Participants were asked to decide between two treatments to fund  
- One drug treats the child form of the disease while the other treats 
the adult form of the disease 
- Hypothetical treatment scenarios included chronic blood disease, 
liver transplant, cancer therapy, palliative care, and eating disorders 
- Half of the participants completed a moral reasoning exercise 
prior to each scenario 
 
Yes – participants were invited to 
select a given allocation principle 
that guided their decision. 
Allocation principles considered 
were:  
- Equal treatment 
- Relief pain and suffering 
- At risk of dying  
- Capacity to benefit longer 
- Most vulnerable  
- Evidence that it works 
- Live a full life 
- Treat those dependent on others 
- Family responsibility  
- Other considerations 
- Productive people 
- Special people 




- Trade-off between 
allocating health gains 
between two general 
populations that varied in 
age, disease severity, 
mortality rate, and number 
of individuals treated 
LE: 20-30 years vs. 
60-70 years 
 
NT: few or many 
 
Gain in LE: Few 
weeks vs. 2-5 years 
- Participants were grouped into discussion groups of 16 individuals  
- Groups must decide between two health technologies to fund, 
each technology benefitting either population A or B 
 - For a given scenario, the two populations differed up to four of 
the following characteristics: age, current health state, health 
outcome with technology, prognosis without the technology, 
dependents, and number of patients who would benefit. 
 
Yes – the participants had to reach 
a consensus as a group and provide 
reasoning for their decision. 
Skedgel et 
al. (2014) 
- Trade-off between 
allocating health gains 
between two populations of 
cancer patients that varied 
in age, disease severity, 
LE: 10 vs. 40 vs. 70 
years 
 
NT: 100 vs. 2500 
vs. 5000 
- Participants were asked to decide which health care program to 
fund 
- All populations in the hypothetical survey had different forms of 
cancer, but specific diagnoses were not mentioned and were simply 
presented as program A or program B 
No – there was no indication that 
participants had to explain their 





mortality rate, and number 
of individuals treated 
 
Gain in LE: 1 vs. 5 
vs. 10 years 
- Each program had a brief description of different attributes and 
levels which varied across each scenario (age, initial utility, initial 




et al. (2015) 
- Trade-off between 
allocating health gains to 
common disease versus rare 
disease patients 
NT: 100 vs 100, 
100 vs 400 
- Participants were asked to allocate funding between (1) rare 
disease and common disease patients as well as (2) rare disease 
patients and other competing healthcare/non-healthcare options 
- Hypothetical survey scenarios varied in the number of common 
disease and rare disease patients treated  
 
 
No – there was no indication that 
participants had to choose an 
allocation principle; however, the 
participants who chose the 
indifferent option were required to 
explain how they would divide the 
available funds.  





2.3  Systematic Review Results 
2.3.1  Preferences in Relation to Health and Income 
Only one study examined socioeconomic-related health inequalities. This study assessed 
inequality aversion in terms of the amount of heath and income the general public is willing 
to give up to reduce these inequities. This study found evidence that the Canadian public is 
more averse to inequalities in the distribution of income than inequalities in the distribution 
of health [12]. Specifically, respondents were willing to sacrifice 56% of their mean income, 
given the remainder was distributed to the public equally. However, respondents did not feel 
the same way about health inequalities. Hurley et al. determined that respondents were 
unwilling to sacrifice any mean lifetime health for a more equal distribution of health gains. 
This is specified through the mean inequality aversion estimates (Atkinson parameter) for 
income and health, of 3.27 and 1.17, respectively [12]. An aversion value less than 1.0 is 
consistent with weak inequality aversion or even inequality-favouring preferences. Hurley et 
al. also explored the bivariate distribution of income-related health, where the aversion 
estimate was 1.66. Given this result was statistically significant, this implies that the 
respondents were willing to sacrifice 3% of their mean life expectancy if the remainder of 
their health was distributed equally [12]. It is important to note that this bivariate aversion 
estimate is not directly comparable to the univariate estimates. The widely used 
Concentration Index of a bivariate inequality assumes a value of two [12]. Therefore, if an 
inequality aversion estimate is 2.0 for a bivariate distribution, this indicates there is no 
socioeconomic-related inequality. In this case, for income-related health, the mean aversion 
estimate is 1.66, suggesting that the participants support inequalities and can be considered 
pro-rich.  
 
2.3.2    Preferences in relation to Younger and Older Age Groups 
Two studies had a similar study design in which half of the respondents were randomly 
selected to complete a moral reasoning exercise (intervention) prior to completing the survey 
—these studies calculated mean preference scores for the intervention and control groups by 
scenario [3], [50]. Preference scores ranged from -5, representing the strongest preference for 




patients; 0 indicated no age preference. Preference scores were used to determine which 
program the respondents would rather fund, one favouring children/younger patients or one 
favouring adults/older patients. Denburg et al. performed only a single survey comparing 
intervention and control results [3] whereas, Johri et al. repeated this study after seven weeks 
to compare the preference scores from baseline and follow-up surveys [43].  
 
Johri et al. included liver transplant, palliative care, depression treatment, lung transplant, 
and coronary bypass in their study as hypothetical resource allocation scenarios [43]. This 
study found that respondents exposed to the moral reasoning exercise were less likely to 
prefer treatment for younger patients than the control group. Additionally, rates of no 
preference between treatments were also higher for the intervention group [43]. Denburg et 
al. included chronic disease, liver transplant, cancer therapy, palliative care, and eating 
disorder treatment in their study as hypothetical funding scenarios [3]. Denburg et al. found 
similar results as Johri et al. – those who were not exposed to the moral reasoning exercise 
(i.e., control group) were more likely to prefer treatment for children, and those exposed to 
the intervention were less likely to prefer treatment allocation to children. Nevertheless, 
preference for allocation to children was retained in cancer therapy and eating disorder 
treatment scenarios across experimental groups [3]. Overall, both studies found age-related 
preferences favouring children and younger patients in resource allocation decisions. 
 
Choudhry et al. focused their study on determining the funding preferences of senior officials 
who are a part of the Ministry of Health (MHO). The respondents were exposed to resource 
allocation decisions that varied in the distribution of benefits (large or small gains) and age. 
The study reported the percentage of respondents favouring one of the two programs and 
those who were undecided/indifferent [44]. Similar to the results of Johri et al. and Denburg 
et al., the respondents here showed stronger preferences for treating younger patients [44]. 
However, when the age gap decreased between scenarios, the proportion of 
undecided/indifferent individuals increased. Regarding the distribution of benefits scenario, 
when the distributional difference was large (e.g., 500 people gain 20 years of life 
expectancy vs. 10 000 people gain 1 year of life expectancy), respondents preferred the 




distributional preference. When the distributional difference scenario was combined with a 
minor age difference, respondents preferred the program that provided more benefit to fewer 
patients when these patients were younger [44]. 
 
One study did not perform any quantitative analysis other than checking the agreement rate 
between two separate groups. Participants were required to allocate resources between two 
populations that varied in several factors such as age, prognosis, dependents, etc. [45]. 
Across the three scenarios, the two groups only disagreed on one choice scenario. Like the 
other age-related allocation studies, there was a preference for funding the younger 
population if sample sizes were the same. The results also suggested a preference for funding 
the worst-off and those facing imminent death [45]. 
 
2.3.3   Societal Value for Orphan Drugs 
Dragojlovic et al. focused on resource allocation decisions between patients with common 
diseases and those with rare diseases. Orphan drugs are intended to treat rare diseases; 
however, the development of these drugs tends to be expensive and may not be cost-
effective. As a result, policy makers struggle when it comes to resource allocation decisions 
involving rare diseases. This Canadian study aimed to provide societal insight on disease 
funding. Overall, the study found that the majority of respondents preferred to fund the 
patients with common diseases over those with rare diseases. However, a relatively large 
portion of participants, around 27%, were indifferent [2]. This Canadian study had a lower 
indifference rate than its Norwegian counterpart (the Canadian study used the Norwegian 
study’s survey) [55]. When respondents selected indifference, they were asked to distribute 
funds between common and rare disease patients; 32% to 48% of respondents allocated the 
funds equally between the two options. Interestingly, when rare and common disease costs 
were framed as equal, 60% of respondents chose to fund rare disease patients. However, 
when costs were presented as unequal (rare diseases costing 4x as much as common 
diseases), only 30% of participants chose the rare disease option. Whether the allocated 
money was considered additional or existing, the portion of respondents choosing rare or 





2.3.4  Preference in relation to Cancer Populations 
Skedgel et al. asked participants to decide which program they would prefer to fund when 
both programs focused on cancer populations [46]. The trade-off was calculated as 
compensating variation (CV) between each ‘attribute.’ Each of the two programs had a brief 
description of different attributes and levels which varied across each survey scenario. 
Attributes included age, initial utility, initial life expectancy, final utility, gain in life 
expectancy and patients treated. Each attribute was assigned three levels, and levels were 
evenly spaced across plausible ranges (e.g., for the attribute age, levels were 10 years old 
(low), 40 years old (baseline/middle), and 70 years old (high)). Compensating variation was 
calculated as changes from the baseline level either upwards to the high level or downwards 
to the low level. CV can be interpreted as the willingness to sacrifice life-years in order to 
give greater priority to a more desirable level or lesser priority for a lesser desirable level 
[46]. This study found similar results as the other identified studies. There was a preference 
for treating younger and larger patient groups as well as patients with the greatest initial life 
expectancy. Overall, respondents favoured larger QALY gains; however, in some cases, 
higher and lower priority was given to patient groups with particular characteristics (or 
‘attributes’). This suggests that respondents demonstrate distributive justice rather than 




Table 3: Study Results. 
Authors 
(date) 
Choice Context Results Interpretation of Results (as per the 
authors) 




in health and 
income inequality 
The mean inequality aversion estimates (Atkinson parameter) were calculated for the 
univariate distributions of income and health and the bivariate distribution of income-
related health. These values are presented below: 
- Income = 3.27  
- Health = 1.17 
- Income-related health = 1.66  
Income: The mean aversion estimate of 3.27 
for income implies that society would be 
willing to give up ∼56% of mean income if 
the remainder were distributed equally.  
 
Health: The mean aversion estimate for 
health is 1.17 and is non-statistically 
significant. 
 
Income-related health: For the bivariate 
income-health distribution, the aversion 
estimate of 1.66 implies that society would be 
willing to give up 3% of mean health-expected 
life expectancy if the remainder were 
distributed equally. 
 
Johri et al. 
(2008) 






Mean preference scores for intervention (moral reasoning exercise) and control groups at 
baseline and follow-up, by scenario, are presented below. Preference scores range from –
5 (strongest preference for younger patients) to +5 (strongest preference for older 
patients); 0 indicates no age preference. 
 
Liver transplant (baseline and follow-up, respectively): 
- Intervention: -1.35 and -1.19; control: -1.89 and -1.48 
 
Palliative care (baseline and follow-up, respectively): 
- Intervention: 0.01 and -0.05; control: 0.15 and 0.01  
 
Depression treatment (baseline and follow-up, respectively): 
 
- Intervention: -0.71 and -0.67; control: -1.04 and -0.92 
 
Lung transplant (baseline and follow-up, respectively): 
- Intervention: -1.24 and -1.10; control: -1.86 and -1.57  
 
Coronary bypass (baseline and follow-up, respectively): 
Participants in the intervention group showed 
weaker preferences for treating younger 
patients than those in the control group. At 
baseline, differences between experimental 
groups were significant (p<0.001) for all 
scenarios except palliative care. In the follow-
up survey, differences between experimental 
groups were significant for three of five 
scenarios (lung transplant (p<0.001), liver 
transplant, and depression treatment (p<0.05)). 
For all groups, rates of "no preference" 
responses were higher for the intervention 








Trade-offs in age 
and distribution of 
benefits 
Participants were asked to decide between two healthcare programs to fund. Programs 
varied in the number of people affected, age, and life expectancy. The percentage of 
respondents preferring each program is presented below. 
 
 
Beneficiaries differ in average age 
Program A (increases life-expectancy of 30-year-olds) vs  
Program B (increases life-expectancy of 50-year-olds):  
- Preferred A (42.5%); preferred B (1.3%); unable to decide/indifferent (56.3%) 
 
Program A (increases life-expectancy of 5-year-olds) vs  
Program B (increases life-expectancy of 65-year-olds):  
- Preferred A (57.5%); preferred B (8.8%); unable to decide/indifferent (33.8%) 
 
Beneficiaries differ in baseline distribution of benefits 
Program A (500 people gain 20 years of life-expectancy) vs. Program B (10 000 people 
gain 1 year of life expectancy): 
- Preferred A (55.8%); preferred B (18.8%); unable to decide/indifferent (22.5%) 
 
Program A (1000 people gain 20 years of life-expectancy) vs Program B (4000 people 
gain 5 years of life expectancy): 
- Preferred A (30.0%); preferred B (25.0%); unable to decide/indifferent (35.0%) 
 
Program A (500 30-year-olds gain 20 years of life-expectancy) vs. Program B (2000 50-
year-olds people gain 5 years of life expectancy): 
- Preferred A (53.8%); preferred B (21.3%); unable to decide/indifferent (25.0%) 
 
Beneficiaries differ in average age: 
Participants showed stronger preferences for 
treating younger patients, and when the age 
difference increased, the proportion of 
undecided participants decreased. 
 
Beneficiaries differ in the distribution of 
benefits: 
Participants showed a preference for scenarios 
with larger benefits for fewer amounts of 
people (distributional preference). When the 
distributional difference decreased, 
participants were more undecided, but the 
proportions of preferring one program over 
the other were similar. When the distributional 
difference was combined with a minor age 
difference, the proportion of undecided 
responses decreased again. Additionally, 
respondents preferred the program that 
provided more benefit to fewer patients when 
these patients were younger. 
Denburg et 
al. (2020) 
Trade-offs in age 
and specific 
health conditions 
Mean preference scores for intervention (moral reasoning exercise) and control groups 
by scenario are presented below. Preference scores range from –5 (strongest preference 
for children) to +5 (strongest preference for adults); 0 indicates no age preference. 
 
Chronic disease: Intervention group = 0.25; control group = -0.47 
 
Liver transplant: Intervention group = 0.05; control group = -0.49 
 
Cancer therapy: Intervention group = -0.83; control group = -1.77 
Those in the control group preferred allocation 
of resources to children in all scenarios. The 
strongest control group preference was for 
cancer therapy and eating disorders, where 
theoretical QALY gains were the largest. 
Those subjected to moral reasoning exercises 
showed a weaker preference for allocation to 
children. However, a significant preference for 





Palliative care: Intervention group = -0.02; control group = -0.43 
 
Eating disorder treatment: Intervention group = -1.11; control group = -2.01 
 
cancer therapy and eating disorder treatment 
scenarios but not in the chronic disease, liver 
transplant, and palliative care scenarios. 
Stafinski et 
al. (2017) 
Trade-offs in age, 
disease severity, 
and distribution of 
benefits 
Three discussion sessions took place where the participants must decide between two 
health technologies to fund. Each technology benefited either population A or B. 
Populations varied by the number of patients who could benefit, current health state, 
prognosis without the technology, health outcome with technology, age, and dependents. 
Two different groups of 16 individuals completed the choice scenarios separately. 
 
The rate of agreement between the two groups for their decision in funding population A 
or B in the hypothetical discussion scenarios is presented below. No other quantitative 
data was reported. 
 
Session 1: 100% (16/16 scenarios) 
Session 2: 100% (16/16 scenarios) 
Session 3: 96.9% (31/32 scenarios) 
 
No quantitative analysis was conducted. 
Qualitative results suggested: 
- If population sizes were the same, there was 
a preference for funding the younger 
population unless the older population is 
facing imminent death.  
- There is a preference for funding health 
technologies that could return patient 
populations to at least sufficient functioning, 
regardless of the population’s 
characteristics.  
- There was a preference for funding 
technologies that help those worse off as 
well as those facing imminent death.  
 
Skedgel et al. 
(2014) 
Trade-offs in age, 
disease severity, 
and distribution of 
benefits 
Empirical ethics were used to identify relevant attributes: patient age, initial health 
utility, life expectancy, final utility, and total patients treated. Each attribute was 
assigned three levels; levels were evenly spaced across plausible ranges. The trade-off 
for each attribute was measured in terms of compensating variation (CV). For each 
attribute, CV was estimated for upward and downward changes from the baseline 
(middle) level and can be interpreted as the willingness to sacrifice individual life-year 
gains in order to secure greater (lesser) priority for a more (less) desirable level. Overall 
compensating variation (CV) by attribute change is presented below. 
 
Attributes (Attribute levels – low, baseline (middle), high) 
 
Patient age (10 years old, 40 years old, 70 years old): 
CV, Baseline (40 years old) to Low (10 years old) = –4.36; Baseline (40 years 
old) to High (70 years old) = 2.91  
 
Initial health utility (0.1, 0.5, 0.9):  
CV, Baseline (0.5) to Low (0.1) = –0.57;  
Baseline (0.5) to High (0.9) = 1.41  
There was a significant preference for 
prioritizing younger and larger patient groups 
and patients with the greatest initial life 
expectancy. There were no significant welfare 
effects over the initial level of health state or 
the best final health state in the smallest 





Life expectancy (1 month, 5 years, 10 years): 
CV, Baseline (5 years) to Low (1 month) = 3.57;  
Baseline (5 years) to High (10 years) = –0.77  
 
Final health utility (0.1, 0.5, 0.9):   
CV, Baseline (0.5) to Low (0.1) = 2.88;  
Baseline (0.5) to High (0.9) = 0.71  
 
Total patients treated (100, 2500, 5000):   
CV, Baseline (2500) to Low (100) = –0.60;  
Baseline (2500) to High (5000) = –4.20 
 
Dragojlovic 





Two surveys were distributed randomly, in which choice scenarios were framed 
differently. The Extra Funds version involved allocating new funds received from the 
MHO, and the Existing Funds version involved allocating current dollars. Both versions 
included scenarios where cost was either presented as equal or unequal. The percentage 
of respondents preferring each scenario is presented below.  
 
Extra funds, equal cost 
100 rare disease patients vs 100 common disease patients: 
- Preferred rare (29.3%); preferred common (40.3%); indifferent (30.4%) 
 
Extra funds, unequal cost 
100 rare disease patients vs 400 common disease patients: 
- Preferred rare (19.9%); preferred common (56.4%); indifferent (23.8%) 
 
Existing funds, equal cost 
100 rare disease patients vs 100 common disease patients: 
- Preferred rare (34.9%); preferred common (34.7%); indifferent (30.4%) 
 
Existing funds, unequal cost 
100 rare disease patients vs 400 common disease patients: 
- Preferred rare (23.2%); preferred common (48.3%); indifferent (28.5%) 
 
 
The majority of the respondents preferred to 
treat common-disease patients, and between 
24% to 30% of respondents were indifferent. 
Respondents allocated to the ‘existing funds' 
survey were more likely to express 
indifference than respondents in the ‘extra 





2.4  Systematic Review Discussion 
This section aimed to pool together existing Canadian literature on societal preferences for 
trade-offs involved in resource allocation decisions. One of the objectives of this study is to 
determine what trade-offs Canadians are willing to make in order to prioritize certain health 
outcomes and how this varies across age groups, specific health conditions, or disease 
severity. Overall, the identified studies provided evidence that the Canadian population 
supports priority weighting; however, these preferences highly depend on the situation 
presented. 
 
Hurley et al. found that respondents were more averse to inequalities in income than in life 
expectancy. However, some UK literature came to the exact opposite conclusion of Hurley et 
al. – their studies suggest that inequality aversion is usually greater towards health than 
income [49], [50]. It seems as if UK respondents want to reduce income inequalities but will 
not give any special treatment to those in lower socioeconomic groups; they do not want to 
treat groups unequally or use the healthcare systems as a means to eliminate this baseline 
disparity [49]. While research involving societal preferences on health disparities and priority 
weighting has been very prominent in the UK, the findings across studies have been 
inconsistent – a UK systematic review came to this same conclusion [1]. These 
inconsistencies may lead to difficulty comparing the relative differences in societal 
preferences between Canada and the UK. However, Dragojlovic et al.’s study on orphan 
drugs described similar preferences as respondents who took part in a UK study on orphan 
drug allocation decisions [2], [49]. It seems that both the UK and Canadian populations 
desire that patients with rare diseases get the same treatment accessibility as those with 
common diseases. However, once the cost is taken into consideration, respondents seem to 
choose the more cost-effective option. 
 
Four studies provided strong support that Canadians prefer allocating limited resources to 
children or younger patients over adults and older patients [3], [43], [44], [46]. Respondents 
claimed children/younger patients would have a greater capacity to benefit longer than older 
patients who have already lived a good portion of their lives [50], [51]. These results are 




type of reasoning – is it just to subjectively decide who has and has not lived a fair portion of 
their life? Interestingly, the two studies which distributed moral reasoning exercises prior to 
the survey saw a decrease in the prioritization of children/younger patients and an increase in 
treating both patient groups equally [3], [43]. This suggests that the moral reasoning exercise 
led respondents to view adults and children as equally worthy of treatment. When resource 
allocation scenarios between adults and children included different disease treatments, 
respondents had a stronger preference for children in cancer therapy and eating disorder 
treatment relative to chronic diseases such as liver transplants and palliative care [3]. Even 
though childhood cancer is relatively uncommon, the term cancer may remind individuals of 
their own mortality. Recent surveys have shown that a quarter of the UK believe that cancer 
diagnosis is a death sentence [50]–[52]. Cancer stigma does affect not only cancer patients 
but also the public’s perception of cancer. It is reasonable that respondents favour children 
over adults in cancer therapy allocation as for decades, cancer has been portrayed as this 
horrible burden that no child should experience.  
 
The magnitude in preference for children in liver transplants varied significantly between the 
two studies. Denburg et al. showed that respondents were almost neutral in the decision 
between adults and children, whereas Johri et al. results leaned significantly towards 
children. The discrepancy in results here may be due to the years these studies took place. 
Johri et al. published their study in 2008, at a time when it is quite possible there was a 
greater stigma around organ transplants than in 2020 when Denburg et al. published their 
study. Since 2010, there has been a 59% increase in organ donors and a 14% increase in new 
patients starting therapy [53]. Given the improvement in technology, increase in donors, and 
success rate, it is plausible that respondents do not see organ transplantation as something as 
scarce as it used to be (albeit it still is). 
 
A few studies required respondents to provide their reasoning or to select an allocation 
principle that helped guide their decision in trade-off scenarios [3], [12], [43], [45]. Common 
rationales of respondents who allocated funds to poor individuals (over rich) chose options 
focused on treating the worst-off and concerns for inequality [12]. Individuals who generally 
chose options favouring the rich focused their rationales on the opportunity to earn higher 




increasing overall average health and stated that no group of individuals is more entitled to 
benefit from a healthcare policy [12]. Regarding studies that focused on trade-offs in specific 
health conditions and age, popular rationales included equality of treatment, relief from 
suffering, patient needs, duration of needs, and maximizing the number of patients helped 
[3], [43], [45]. 
 
2.5  Systematic Review Limitations  
This review has a few limitations worth mentioning. First, at the review level, there may be a 
risk of publication bias as negative results (i.e., showing no societal preference) would be 
less likely to be published, and thus, this review may overestimate preferences. Secondly, 
during our search, we only considered English language studies and did not search through 
gray literature; this may affect the internal validity of our review. Lastly, only three 
electronic databases were searched, limiting the number of eligible studies for this systematic 
review. 
 
2.6  Systematic Review Conclusion 
In conclusion, this review provides evidence that the Canadian population is generally averse 
to health disparities in health and income. The general public also tends to prioritize certain 
patient groups in allocation decisions. These results are consistent with research in the UK 
[1], [54]. It is evident that the Canadian population favours age-based rationing in situations 
where resources are scarce. Thus, is it reasonable for policy-makers to continue using 
traditional economic evaluations when Canadians have expressed concerns for the 
distribution of health? Although it is challenging to quantify the extent of Canadians’ 
preferences in allocation decisions, priority weighting estimates should eventually be 
incorporated into practice. Currently, some health disparity concerns are addressed in 
healthcare allocation decisions through increased WTP thresholds; however, this threshold is 
commonly used for terminal and rare diseases [34]. For the most part, these economic 
evaluations do not consider health, age, or income-related preferences in a quantifiable 
estimate. It is possible to prematurely implement distributional preferences in practice; 




exhibit different preferences depending on the patient or sociodemographic group at hand 
(i.e., health domain versus the income domain [55].) Therefore, to provide accurate 
projections of societal preferences, further research in each domain is required to properly 
assess which healthcare programs deserve a higher priority in allocation decisions. However, 
it is important to note that numerous respondents did express concern that healthcare funds 
should not be a means to eliminate baseline disparities but should be used to provide 
everyone with an equal opportunity to obtain health gains [56]. 
 
This review did not find any literature comparing trade-offs between cancer versus non-
cancer conditions. There is insufficient evidence to inform whether health benefits associated 
with cancer and non-cancer therapies should be weighted differently in Canadian resource 
allocation decisions. As previously mentioned, the WTP thresholds used to assess cancer 
therapies are 3x as costly as non-cancer therapies [34]. Although one study included in this 
review used cancer patients as their hypothetical population, it focused on preferences in 
regard to age, disease severity, and distribution of benefits rather than using cancer as the 
defining feature between populations. One study that may provide the most insight into our 
research question is the one comparing rare diseases versus common diseases. Although most 
cancers are considered common diseases, the cost of cancer treatment is comparable to that 
of orphan drugs. Using a framework that evaluates cancer health outcomes against non-
cancer health outcomes may yield different results. Many individuals view cancer as a “death 
sentence” and associate it with emotional and physical trauma [57]. Therefore, a trade-off 
study directly comparing cancer to non-cancer conditions is necessary to determine accurate 








3  Introduction to Questionnaire Design 
The systematic review we performed in chapter 2 revealed a lack of studies regarding 
societal preferences for priority weighting in healthcare allocation decisions. There was 
specifically a gap in the literature regarding cancer therapies. Although one study used cancer 
patients as their hypothetical population, it focused on priority weighting in terms of age, 
disease severity, and distribution of benefits. There was no Canadian study directly 
comparing preferences for health benefits associated with cancer therapies against non-
cancer therapies. For this reason, we conducted a survey to understand the societal 
preferences for the trade-off between cancer and non-cancer outcomes. This would inform 
resource allocation decisions and also help decision makers understand whether or not cancer 
outcomes should be valued differently in their decision-making. Therefore, the objectives of 
the survey are: 
1. To elicit societal preferences for trade-offs between cancer and non-cancer health 
outcomes in the Canadian population and, 
 
2. To determine associations between these preferences and demographic factors, 
specifically, whether a personal relationship with a cancer patient will influence said 
preferences. 
 
This chapter focuses on developing and designing our trade-off questionnaire. It will first 
cover a layout of the questionnaire as well as our rationale on why specific disease 
comparisons were used. It will then cover terminology and formatting considerations. 
 
3.1  Development of Questionnaire 
The questionnaire contained 18 trade-off questions in the format of multiple choice. The 
questionnaire was separated into three scenarios. Participants were asked to consider options 
to allocate additional available funds to patients with non-cancer health problems (option A) 




between cancer patients and non-cancer patients in terms of age, gender, race, ethnicity, or 
income and that both options will treat an equal number of cancer and non-cancer patients. 
Participants had the option to specify that they were indifferent between the two options at 
any point in the trade-off exercise. They also had the opportunity to explain their reasoning 
on why they chose one option over the other. In each scenario, the participants were told that 
their Local Health Board has recently received new (additional) funds to allocate between 
two patient groups and is asking for the participant’s help on who should receive the funding. 
 
In the first scenario, these funds can be used to treat cancer conditions (e.g., breast cancer, 
lung cancer, bowel cancer, etc.) or non-cancer conditions with potentially fatal outcomes 
(e.g., heart disease, kidney failure, etc.). This scenario focused on broad groups of diseases 
(i.e., cancer versus non-cancer) without particularly focusing on specific types of conditions. 
The aim of this scenario was to elicit trade-offs in relation to the general categories of cancer 
and non-cancer conditions. This is important because many health technology assessment 
bodies in the world, including in Canada, use a higher cost-effectiveness threshold for cancer 
drug reimbursement, implying that cancer outcomes are valued higher than non-cancer 
outcomes. In this scenario, we also decided to add multiple examples of common cancers and 
common non-cancer conditions to promote heterogeneity in the participant’s thought process 
instead of a fixation on one example. A secondary consideration is that decision-making is 
closely linked to the identifiability of a patient [58]. Without examples, individuals would 
subconsciously gravitate to support cancer patients, as the word “cancer” itself is more 
meaningful than “non-cancer.” Previous studies have shown that individuals feel more of a 
moral obligation to help individuals that are “identifiable” or “common” to them [58]–[61]. 
 
The second scenario defined the allocation problem in terms of patients with lung cancer 
versus patients with heart failure. Here, we wanted to compare two diseases that had low 
survival rates as well as expensive treatment costs to represent the difficulties of healthcare 
resource allocation decisions. One of the differences between the first two scenarios is that 
not all of the diseases listed in scenario 1 are fatal. For instance, breast cancer is known to 
have a high survival rate, and some women even claim their quality of life improved when 




[62]. In this scenario, lung cancer was chosen as the fatal cancer condition, as we are also 
interested in the effect of self-inflicted diseases on the public’s preferences [63]. Originally, 
we considered describing how these individuals may have acquired lung cancer (e.g., 
smokers or coal miners); however, we decided to leave this up to their interpretation as 
mentioning that these patients are smokers may lead to a response bias. For non-cancer 
conditions, kidney failure was initially considered our focus; however, those who lack a 
science background may not understand how vital the kidney is to survive. Consequently, we 
chose heart failure as we believed that most adults understand the importance of the heart in 
the body. Heart failure is also a disease that some deem as self-inflicted due to poor diet and 
lack of exercise; however, the presumptions against lung cancer are much more severe [63], 
[64].  
 
The first two scenarios presented health gains in terms of individual gains (e.g., average 5 
months of life per patient). However, the third scenario used a population framework to 
present health gains (e.g., average 5,000 months of life per population). Here, we were 
interested in the effect of a population framework on societal preference. Previous studies 
have shown that physicians and lay people vary their decisions when evaluating an individual 
patient versus a group of individuals [65]. Relative to groups, individuals are also seen as a 
psychologically coherent unit, resulting in stronger impressions made about individuals than 
groups [66].  
 
In the third scenario, we made the comparison of lung cancer prevention against diabetes 
prevention. Once again, both diseases can be seen as self-inflicted (type 2 diabetes); 
however, there is less pressure on the participants in this scenario as the question focuses on 
funding prevention rather than treatment. In this scenario, diabetes was chosen as our non-
cancer group, as it is a prevalent disease and can be fatal if left untreated. Unlike lung cancer, 
diabetes has an effective treatment to allow the management of the disease. We also wanted 
to compare a common disease (diabetes) against a less common disease (lung cancer). 
Although lung cancer is not considered a rare disease, previous research has shown that the 
public does not prioritize the treatment of rare diseases over common diseases. However, this 




rarity of the disease [48], [59], [67], [68]. One of the issues with this disease-blind 
framework is that participants are reluctant to fund rare diseases, knowing it is at the expense 
of those suffering from common diseases [2]. We are interested to see whether disease 
characteristics such as treatment availability/curability and severity will influence the 
public’s response.  
 
Within each scenario, six choice pairs were presented. Choice pair 1 in each scenario had 
equal total health gains for option A and option B; however, with each subsequent question, 
the total health gains in option B decreased, representing that cancer treatment may produce 
fewer healthy years of life as compared to non-cancer treatment, for the same level of 
resources. With the total health gains in option B being lesser than that of option A, 
participants were required to choose between efficiency (i.e., maximizing the sum total of 
health) and giving priority to cancer conditions. This choice reflects a trade-off as 
participants will face a conflict between selecting an option that has been consistently 
efficient throughout the questionnaire or an option that supports a ‘high priority’ patient 
group [28]. Participants who select option B will be giving up pure economic efficiency in 
hopes of achieving a social goal, such as reducing the health disparity in cancer patients.  
 
Aside from the lack of literature on societal preferences regarding cancer therapies, we were 
also interested in whether the term “cancer” triggers a response in our participants, especially 
if these individuals have a personal connection with someone who had cancer. There is 
evidence of high levels of emotional distress and affective disorders manifesting in those 
who are caregivers for cancer patients as well as cancer patients themselves [69]. Previous 
research has also provided evidence that many individuals still associate cancer with death 
and would even go as far as calling it a “death sentence,” despite cancer mortality rates 
steadily decreasing [70]. Therefore, it is a possibility that the negative perception of cancer 
and the emotional distress associated with this disease may influence the public’s preference 
on trade-off decisions more than other high-priority diseases would. For this reason, the 
questionnaire also collected individual-level demographic information (i.e., age, gender, 
income, education, employment in the healthcare sector, and personal relationship to cancer 
















3.1.1  Presentation of Choice Sets in the Questionnaire 
When creating the questionnaire, we considered a “slider bar” format as a continuous 
outcome is more desirable to analyze; however, after reviewing previous studies, the slider 
bar tool is associated with a starting point and centrality bias [26], [71]. Starting point bias 
can be described as when participants are required to move the slider in one direction or the 
other and are hesitant to move too far from the original starting point. Centrality bias is 
similar to starting point bias in the sense that participants are reluctant to move the slider too 
far from the mid-point of the bar, essentially avoiding the extremities of the slider bar. For 
these reasons, a concrete choice format was used to pressure respondents to choose one 
option over the other without feeling the need to select something in between.    
 
When constructing each scenario, we considered mentioning the 5-year survival rate or the 
life expectancies of each type of patient mentioned; however, we came across a few issues. 
First, we did not want to skew participants’ responses by implying cancer patients should 
receive special treatment due to the rarity and low survival rate of this disease. As mentioned 
earlier, we are interested in whether the word “cancer” triggers a response in these 
participants. Secondly, the literature regarding the conditions mentioned did not have a 
consistent unit of measurement. Some diseases only had data for 5-year survival rates, 
whereas others only had the life expectancy of patients at a specific age of diagnosis. With 
this information varying significantly, we believed that presenting these values would 
confuse the participants and weaken the question.  
 
Many alternatives of questionnaire formatting and wording were discussed when creating our 
questionnaire. As our target population was the general public, we wanted to avoid using 
advanced vocabulary or examples which may seem confusing. For instance, the term “the 
citizen advisory panel” was initially used instead of “your local health board” to introduce 
the allocation scenarios; however, we believed this terminology would be too intimidating to 
the average person. As a result, we attempted to word the questionnaire using primary-level 
vocabulary and avoiding jargon. With this in mind, we did not want to use the term “QALY” 
in our questionnaire and instead used the general term of health gains. Health gain units were 
initially presented in years; however, after review from a few experts in the field, they 




more desirable as most cancer drugs provide an expected survival gain of 1-6 months; 
therefore, months is a more realistic unit of measurement [72]. Respondents may also be able 
to conceptually visualize a health gain in months more clearly than a health gain in years. 
 
In each scenario, the two funding options treated both patient groups (cancer patients and 
non-cancer patients); however, each option's health gain distribution varied. We wanted to 
ensure that neither option denied any patient treatment as some individuals may view this 
choice as unethical or immoral. Similarly, we avoided the use of the word “death” as we did 
not want to use a “deny-framework” (presenting outcomes in terms of losses) as it elicits 
negative emotions in individuals due to its association with scarcity and forced-choice [68]. 
Using a “give-framework” (presenting outcomes in terms of gains) would most likely be 
regarded positively and allow participants to think through the questions more rationally. For 
simplicity, we used graphs to display the health gains of the two funding options. Later, we 
decided to calculate and display the total health gain for both patient groups and the 
difference in health gains between patient groups, so the participants did not need to perform 
any calculations themselves. We aimed to make the funding choice as straightforward as 
possible, with no room for ambiguity.  
 
To conclude, this questionnaire was created in reference to previous studies to ensure clarity 
and to avoid common biases. During the design phase, the questionnaire was reviewed by 
experts in the field, who provided us with insightful commentary and suggestions. A few 
colleagues and friends later piloted it to confirm its comprehensibility.   
 
3.2  Questionnaire Design Conclusion 
Although cancer mortality rates are decreasing, the low survival rates have resulted in cancer 
reimbursement approaches being handled differently from other diseases [73]. This is made 
apparent in the creation of two separate review processes for drug reimbursements in Canada, 
the pCODR is used for cancer drugs, and the CDR for drugs for all other diseases. 
Additionally, the WTP threshold for cancer treatment is generally 3x higher than other 
healthcare interventions. Cancer drugs being evaluated differently from other health 




whether it is appropriate to view cancer QALYs as more valuable and if the general public 
agrees with this notion [73].  Therefore, this survey was created to elicit societal preferences 
on the trade-offs between cancer and non-cancer health outcomes to help inform decision 












4  Introduction to Survey Methodology 
Our survey was carefully created to elicit Canadian societal preferences on the trade-offs 
between cancer and non-cancer health outcomes. This survey is specifically of importance as 
many countries, including Canada, use a higher cost-effectiveness threshold for cancer drug 
reimbursement, implying that cancer outcomes are valued higher than non-cancer outcomes. 
The objectives of the survey analysis are: 
1. To determine the extent of priority weighting for cancer health outcomes relative to 
non-cancer health outcomes using preference weights,  
 
2. To describe the distribution of said preferences using a response classification system, 
 
3. To uncover and analyze associations between preferences and demographic factors. 
 
We hypothesize that: 
1. There will be priority weighting for cancer health outcomes as many health 
technology assessment bodies use a higher cost-effectiveness threshold for cancer 
drug reimbursement, 
 
2. There will be an association between respondents who prioritize cancer health 
outcomes and those who have a personal connection with a cancer patient. This is 
based on the fact that cancer is linked to high levels of emotional distress (in patients 
and their caregivers), which may prompt respondents to sympathize with them. 
 
This section will focus on the methodology of our survey. First, an overview of the 
questionnaire, target population, and sample size calculation will be described. The process 
of quantifying preferences as well as categorizing response types will also be covered, which 
are two of our key outcomes. This chapter will then explain our dependent and independent 





4.1  Methodology 
4.1.1   Summary of Questionnaire 
The questionnaire was separated into three scenarios. The first focused on all cancer patients 
against all patients with severe non-cancer conditions. The second scenario narrowed in on 
patients with lung cancer versus patients with heart failure. The third scenario compared lung 
cancer prevention against diabetes prevention. Each scenario required participants to allocate 
additional treatment funds between two hypothetical health programs, option A and option B, 
or indicate indifference. These options showed health gains received by two patient groups, 
non-cancer patients and cancer patients. The total health gain and the difference in health 
gain between the patient groups were presented for both options. In the first pair of each 
scenario, options A and B produced the same total health gain, but the distribution of health 
gain varied between patient groups. Option A allocated more funds to non-cancer patients, 
and option B allocated more funds to cancer patients. In the first pair of each question, the 
total health gains were equal between option A and option B; however, in subsequent pairs, 
the health gain began to decrease for cancer patients in option B. As the health gains to 
cancer patients in option B gradually decreased, the reduction in health disparity and total 
health gain also decreased. The total health gains and distribution of health gains remained 
the same in option A throughout the questionnaire. For example, option A gave a 10-month 
health gain to non-cancer patients and a 5-month health gain to cancer patients in the first 
pair. Option B, on the contrary, gave a 10-month health gain to cancer patients and a 5-month 
health gain to non-cancer patients. In the subsequent pair, option A remained the same, 
whereas option B gave a 9-month health gain to cancer patients and a 5-month health gain to 
non-cancer patients. In option B, the health gain for cancer patients continued to decrease by 
one month until it reached 5-months gradually. The degree of priority weighting is captured 
when a respondent switched from option B to option A or became indifferent between the 
two programs. After each scenario, respondents also had the opportunity to explain why they 





4.1.2   Response Classification System 
Depending on when a respondent switches between options or chooses indifference, we can 
categorize them into four response patterns. If a respondent chose option A in the first pair, 
they are labeled as “Pro-non-cancer.” If a respondent was indifferent between options A and 
B in the first pair, then chose option A in the next pair, they are considered a “Health 
maximizer.” If a respondent initially chose option B in the first pair and later switched to 
option A, they are considered a “Weighted prioritarian.” However, if a respondent never 
switched to option A (i.e., chose option B or was indifferent at the last pair), they are 
classified as a “Strong prioritarian.” See Table 4 for more detail on the response 
classification system.  
 
Some responses were considered logically inconsistent and, therefore, removed from the 
analysis. This includes individuals who switched between option B and option A more than 
once and individuals who initially chose option A and later switched to option B. This type 
of response is ill-founded as the health gains in option B are less than those in option A. 
Thus, it is not reasonable to initially choose a health program with larger total health gains 
and then switch to one with fewer total health gains. If the respondent were concerned with 
prioritizing cancer patients, they would have initially chosen option B in the first pair. These 
types of responses hinder our ability to calculate the degree preference. We are interested in 
the trade-off point – how much total health gain is a respondent willing to sacrifice for a 
more equitable distribution of health until they consider it inefficient?  
 
Trade-off points (or points of indifference) are calculated as the number of health gains for 
cancer patients in option B when the respondent becomes indifferent or switches options. For 
example, if an individual initially chose option A for the first two pairs, then becomes 
indifferent at the third pair – which is when option B gives 8-months of health gain to cancer 
patients, the trade-off point is 8 (since the respondent is indifferent at 8 units of health 
benefit). However, if a respondent chose option B in the first two pairs and switches to option 
A in the third pair, the trade-off point is 8.5 (since the respondent becomes indifferent at 
some point between 8 and 9 units of health benefit). As a result, there are 13 potential 





Table 4: Response Classification System. 
Category Label Response Pattern
a Point of Indifference
b
 
1 Pro-non-cancer AAAAAA >10 
2 Health maximizer =AAAAA 10.0 
3 Weighted prioritarian BAAAAA 9.5 
4 Weighted prioritarian B=AAAA 9.0 
5 Weighted prioritarian BBAAAA 8.5 
6 Weighted prioritarian BB=AAA 8.0 
7 Weighted prioritarian BBBAAA 7.5 
8 Weighted prioritarian BBB=AA 7.0 
9 Weighted prioritarian BBBBAA 6.5 
10 Weighted prioritarian BBBB=A 6.0 
11 Weighted prioritarian  BBBBBA 5.5 
12 Strong prioritarian  BBBBB= 5.0 
13 Strong prioritarian BBBBBB <5 
 
a. Each question requires respondents to choose from three choices: option A, option B, or indifference; 
these choices are presented as A, B, or =, respectively. For instance, an individual who chooses option 
B for all six questions will be denoted as BBBBBB. 
b. This represents the number of years (health gains) dedicated to cancer therapy in option B when the 
respondent is indifferent between options A and B. For participants who switch directly from B to A, 
the midpoint between A and B is used. 
 
 
4.1.3  Sample Size Calculation  
When exploring previous Canadian literature regarding allocation decisions in healthcare, 
sample sizes ranged from 100 to 2000 participants. Using an alpha value of 0.05 and a power 
value of 0.80, we calculated that a sample size of at least 150 participants is required to 
obtain a statistically significant result (p-value < 0.05). This calculation assumed the largest 
possible standard deviation for our primary outcome. Our primary outcome is the mean 
preference weight, which can only take on values from 1.0 to 2.50; therefore, a standard 
deviation of 0.75 was used. 
 




responses. These include responses in which a participant may initially choose option A 
(favouring non-cancer conditions) but later switch to option B (favouring cancer conditions). 
This is logically inconsistent and would impact our ability to estimate our effect measure 
(i.e., preference weights). Additionally, due to the repetitive nature of the questionnaire, we 
expected that some participants might quit before completing it. Therefore, a sample size of 
300 participants was desired; the rationale for doubling the sample size is based on two 
studies. Firstly, Robson et al., who distributed a questionnaire very similar to ours, 
determined that of the respondents who partook in the survey, 53% provided “logical” 
responses [54]. Secondly, a general study that reviewed over 200 studies found that the 
average response rate for survey data collected from individuals was 52.7% [74]. For 
simplicity, we doubled our sample size as we expected to lose about half of our participants' 
data to either logically inconsistent responses or incompletion (specifically, the last scenario). 
 
4.1.4   Participants 
The population of interest was the general Canadian public. Participants were required to 
speak English and be residents in Canada to be included in the study. Participants were 
excluded if they were younger than the age of 18. Participants were recruited through a third-
party recruitment company, Prolific.co [75]. Prolific.co uses a convenience sampling method; 
therefore, participants who were deemed eligible based on the pre-screening criteria were 
permitted to complete the survey on a first-come-first-serve basis. The pre-screening criteria 
included the questions: “In what country do you currently reside in?” and “What is your date 
of birth?” Data collection took place between June 14 – 16th, 2021.   
 
The questionnaire was created and presented to participants using an online survey panel 
known as Qualtrics [76]. The questionnaire took no longer than 30 minutes to complete After 
distributing the survey, we obtained 316 participants who completed the survey; of these, 253 
individuals provided logically consistent responses to all scenarios. Responses that were 
logically inconsistent across all three scenarios were removed from the analysis. Participants 
who provided consistent choices for some scenarios but not all remained in the analysis; 
however, the logically inconsistent scenario(s) was excluded. For instance, if an individual 




the analysis, while scenario 3 results were removed as this may represent survey exhaustion. 
See Figure 3 for a flowchart of suitable responses. 
 
 
Figure 3: Flowchart of Suitable Responses. 
1. Logically inconsistent responses include answers where the respondent had switched from option B to 
option A, then back to option B again (response pattern, e.g., BBAABB). This also includes participants 
who initially chose option A but later switched to option B, as they did not understand the purpose of the 
exercise (response pattern, e.g., AAAAAB). See Table 4 for details on the response classification system.  
2. Responses that were consistent for at least one scenario were kept, logically inconsistent responses from the 











4.2 Measurements and Analysis Plan 
4.2.1  Primary Outcome – Preference Weight 
The first outcome of interest is the mean and median preference weight. Here, the preference 
weight can be described as the extent that an individual prefers funding cancer treatment over 
non-cancer treatment (priority weighting). This is a discrete value, ranging from 1.0 to 2.50. 
The value of 1.0 indicates no greater preference for gain in cancer outcomes over non-cancer 
outcomes, and 2.50 indicates the highest preference for cancer outcomes [12].  
 
For each respondent, the preference weight is calculated by dividing the amount of health 
gains benefited to non-cancer patients in option A by the amount of health gains benefited to 
cancer patients in option B at the switching point. For instance, if a respondent chooses 
indifference at the fourth pair –when cancer patients benefit 7-months of health gain in 
option B, the preference weight calculation would be 10 divided by 7, resulting in a value of 
1.43. Note, in option A, non-cancer patients benefit 10-months of health gain throughout the 
survey. The average health gain is used for respondents who switch from option B to option 
A without choosing indifference. This preference weight can be interpreted as the respondent 
weighing cancer patients 1.43 times more highly than non-cancer patients. We perform a 
nonparametric test of significance (Wilcoxon signed-rank test) to determine whether the 
sample's median differs significantly from 1.0 (no preference) for each of the three scenarios. 
 
4.2.2  Secondary Outcome – Distribution of Response Categories 
The second outcome of interest is the proportion of respondents categorized into the four 
main response patterns: pro-non-cancer, health maximizer, weighted prioritarian, and strong 
prioritarian. Respondents are grouped into these categories by their switching point. This 
variable was coded as categorical with four levels. More information on these categories has 
already been covered in section 4.1.2. 
 
Here, we are interested in whether the distribution of responses differs across scenarios. First, 
we present the proportion of the four response categories (i.e., health maximizer, 
prioritarians, etc.) in each scenario. Since the data was not normally distributed, we presented 




hypothesis of no difference in cumulative ranks and equality of proportions tests of the null 
hypothesis of no difference in the probability of each response category between scenarios.  
 
Next, we conducted regression analysis using an ordered probit model of the response 
categories (4 levels). The order of levels 1 through 4 were pro-non-cancer, health maximizer, 
weighted prioritarian, and strong prioritarian, respectively. We also present the regression 
results using a combined response category probit model (2 levels). This model uses a binary 
version of the response category variable. “Pro-non-cancer” and “health maximizer” are 
grouped into one level, while “weighted prioritarian” and “strong prioritarian” are grouped 
into the second level. We are interested in the factors that influence someone to associate 
greater priority to cancer, which is our rationale for combining these categories. These 
models are presented with respondent covariates (i.e., age, income, etc.) and without 
covariates. 
 
Lastly, an additional ordered probit analysis was performed to compare the scenarios' 
switching points (trade-off points). Conditional probabilities were then calculated using 
marginal statistics. All analyses were done on the statistical analysis software SAS v9.4 and 
Stata v17.0 [77], [78]. 
 
4.2.3  Independent Variable - Age 
Age is a categorical variable based on the respondent’s answer to the question “What is your 
age group?” Possible answers included: 18 to 24 years, 25 to 39 years, 40 to 60 years, and 
60+ years. For the purpose of the analysis, the last two categories were grouped together as 
40+ years. 
 
4.2.4  Independent Variable - Gender 
Gender is a categorical variable based on the respondent’s answer to the question “What is 
your gender?” Possible answers included: Male, Female, and Non-binary/third gender. Due 
to low response count, non-binary/third gender observations were dropped in the regression 




logistic/probit models is a minimum of 10 outcome events per predictor to produce unbiased 
results [79]. A simulation study where only the number of events varied demonstrated that 
models with less than ten observations in a category produced unreliable confidence 
intervals, increased bias, and resulted in issues with model convergence [79]. The inclusion 
of these observations may have led to imprecise coefficients and conclusions. As a result, 
gender was coded as a dichotomous variable in the probit models. 
 
4.2.5  Independent Variable – Education 
Education is a categorical variable based on the respondent’s answer to the question, “What 
is your highest level of education?” Possible answers included: No formal education, Some 
formal education, High school graduate, College diploma, Bachelor’s degree, and Post-
graduate degree. Due to the low response count, some formal education observations were 
dropped in the covariate analysis as this category only had six observations. For the same 
reasons mentioned in section 4.2.4, Education was coded as a variable with five levels in the 
probit models. 
 
4.2.6  Independent Variable - Income 
 Income is a categorical variable based on the respondent’s answer to the question “What is 
your annual household income?” Possible answers included: Less than $30,000, $30,000 to 
$69,999, $70,000 to $99,999, $100,000 to $200,0000, and Greater than $200,000. For the 
purpose of the analysis, the last two categories were grouped together as Greater than 
$100,000. 
 
4.2.7  Independent Variable – Relationship with Cancer Patients 
‘Relationship with cancer patients’ is a categorical variable based on the respondent’s answer 
to two questions. First, the respondent was asked, “Do you personally know someone who 
has or had cancer?” Answers included: Yes or No. If the respondent answered Yes, they were 
prompted with the question, “What is your relationship with this individual? (If you know 
more than one person with cancer, please choose the person closest to you).” Possible 




Other. The relationship with cancer patients variable was then coded as categorical with four 
levels: No, Yes - Immediate family member, Yes - Distant relative, Yes - Friend, and Yes- 
Other. 
 
4.2.8  Independent Variable – Healthcare Worker 
’Healthcare worker’ is a dichotomous variable based on the respondent’s answer to the 
question, “Are you a healthcare worker or do you work in a healthcare setting?” Possible 
answers included: Yes or No. If the respondent answered Yes, they were then asked, “What is 
your occupation there?” Here, an open box appeared for respondents to type their answers in. 
This second question was not used in the analysis.   
 
4.2.9  Descriptive Statistics  
Descriptive statistics were produced to evaluate any correlation between demographic 
characteristics and the tendency to prioritize cancer patients. We are particularly interested in 
whether a personal relationship with a cancer patient will influence decisions. Frequency 
distributions were calculated for age, gender, education, household income, relationship to 
cancer patients, and healthcare worker. 
 
4.2.10 Qualitative Data 
Respondents had the opportunity to explain their rationale on why they initially chose option 
A or option B. These data were summarized into common themes across each scenario, and a 









5 Results Introduction 
This chapter presents the findings of the survey. First, the chapter will summarize the 
descriptive statistics of the sample population. It will then provide results of nonparametric 
tests followed by regressions analyses to assess the association with the predictors described 
in the previous chapter. It will also present qualitative responses on the common themes in 
respondents’ rationale for their allocation choices.  
 
5.1  Statistical Results  
5.1.1  Descriptive Statistics  
Of the total respondents, 96% to 99% of participants completed the section on demographic 
and personal characteristics. There was approximately an equal number of male and female 
respondents. This population's most common age group was 25 to 39 years old, with 52% of 
participants falling into this category. Only 17% of respondents were 40+ years old. Most 
individuals had post-secondary education, with 15% having a college diploma, 42% a 
bachelor’s degree, and 19% a post-graduate degree. Regarding annual household income, 
16% made less than $30,000, 29% were in the $30,000-$69,000 range, 23% were in the 
$70,000-$69,000 range and 32% made greater than $100,000. One of the study’s objectives 
is to determine whether a relationship to a cancer patient may skew a participant’s response; 
77% of individuals knew an individual with cancer. Of these individuals, 56% of participants 
had an immediate family member with cancer. Only 7% of study participants worked in a 
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5.1.2  Distribution of Responses by Scenario 
Figure 4 shows the distribution of the four response categories across scenarios. Each stacked 
bar represents the proportion of responses ranging from pro-non-cancer to strong prioritarian.  
In scenario 1, the percentage of respondents who were categorized as a health maximizer, 
prioritarian, and pro-non-cancer was 60.3%, 28.7%, and 11.0%, respectively. In scenario 2, 
the percentage of respondents who were categorized as a health maximizer, prioritarian, and 
pro-non-cancer was 75.5%, 10.2%, and 14.3%, respectively. In scenario 3, the percentage of 
respondents who were categorized as a health maximizer, prioritarian, and pro-non-cancer 





Note: scenario 1 focused on all cancer patients versus patients with severe non-cancer conditions at an 
individual level; scenario 2 focused on lung cancer patients versus heart failure patients at an individual level; 








The Wilcoxon signed-rank test for paired data was used to evaluate whether the median 
distribution of the response categories varied significantly between two scenarios; the null 
hypothesis is no difference in response category distribution. Using this test to evaluate 
scenario 2 against scenario 1, there was a significant result that the distribution of response 
categories differed between the two scenarios (p < 0.001). There was also a significant 
difference in response category distribution between scenario 2 and scenario 3 (p < 0.001). 
However, there was no significant difference between scenario 1 and scenario 3 (p = 0.231).  
 
A test of proportions was used to evaluate which response category differed significantly 
between the scenarios; the null hypothesis is no difference in the proportion of the selected 
category. In other words, this test evaluates the proportion of a response category (i.e., health 
maximizers) in scenarios 1 and 2 directly. This was performed for each response category 
between each set of scenarios. Scenario 1 and scenario 3 had a significantly larger proportion 
of prioritarians relative to scenario 2 by 18.5% (p < 0.001) and 15.5% (p < 0.001), 
respectively. Scenario 2 had a significantly greater proportion of health maximizers than 
scenario 1 of 15.2% (p < 0.001). The remaining comparisons of response category 
proportions were not significantly different across scenarios. 
 
The decrease in prioritarians in scenario 2 may be due to the fact that two fatal conditions 
were compared (heart failure and lung cancer); thus, it is likely that many respondents may 
not be willing to prioritize one over the other. The increase in prioritarians in scenario 3 
maybe because lung cancer is seen as a more fatal disease than diabetes which currently has 












Table 6: Percentage of Respondents in Each Category (Nonparametric Statistical Tests) . 
 Health Maximizers Prioritarians Pro-non-cancer  
Scenario 1 60.3% 28.7% 11.0%  
Scenario 2 75.5% 10.2% 14.3%  
Scenario 3 64.8% 25.8% 9.5%  
Hypotheses Difference in % 
That are Health 
Maximizers1,3 
Difference in % 
That are 
Prioritarians1,3 










15.2% (p < 0.001) -18.5% (p < 0.001) 3.3% (p = 0.249) z = -4.030;  




10.7% (p = 0.007) -15.5% (p < 0.001) 4.9% (p = 0.084) z = -4.779;  




-4.5% (p = 0.284) 2.91% (p = 0.448) 1.5% (p = 0.552) z = -1.198; 
 p = 0.231 
 
1. Health maximizers = individuals who were indifferent between Option A and B in the first pair; 
Prioritarians = weighted or strong prioritarians, individuals who initially chose Option B in the first pair; 
Pro-non-cancer = individuals who chose option A in the first pair.  
 
2. The Wilcoxon signed-rank test for paired data was used to evaluate whether the median distribution of the 
response categories varied significantly between the two scenarios; the null hypothesis is no difference in 
response category distribution 
 
3. A test of proportions was used to evaluate which response category differed significantly between the 
scenarios; the null hypothesis is no difference in the proportion of the selected category. 
Note: scenario 1 focused on all cancer patients versus patients with severe non-cancer conditions at an 
individual level; scenario 2 focused on lung cancer patients versus heart failure patients at an individual level; 
scenario 3 focused on lung cancer prevention versus diabetes prevention at a population level. 
 
 
Figure 5 shows the distribution of responses in more detail for the three scenarios. The 
vertical axis shows the cumulative proportion of respondents who switched to option A 
(favouring non-cancer conditions) by the trade-off point presented on the horizontal axis. The 
stronger the preference for allocation to cancer treatment, the later a respondent would 




cumulative curves. As previously mentioned, scenario 2 had significantly fewer prioritarians 




Figure 5: Cumulative Distribution of Trade-Points across Scenarios. 
Note: scenario 1 focused on all cancer patients versus patients with severe non-cancer conditions at an 
individual level; scenario 2 focused on lung cancer patients versus heart failure patients at an individual level; 
scenario 3 focused on lung cancer prevention versus diabetes prevention at a population level. 
 
 
5.1.3  Mean and Median Preference Weights 
Table 7 presents the mean and median preference weights by scenario. The Wilcoxon signed-
rank test was used to evaluate whether the median preference weight of each scenario is 
significantly different than 1.00 – this value was used as our comparison since it represents 
no preference for cancer outcomes. Therefore, we are interested in whether there is a 
significant difference between the observed median preference weight and no preference 
(i.e., null hypothesis = 1.00). We used the non-parametric Wilcoxon signed-rank test to test 





Scenarios 1, 2, and 3 had mean preference weights of 1.14, 1.05, and 1.20, respectively. 
Scenario 2 had the lowest mean preference value, while scenario 3 had the highest. 
Interestingly, each scenario had the same median preference values of 1.00, scenario 1 (p < 
0.001) and scenario 3 (p < 0.001) produced a statistically significant result while, scenario 2 
did not (p = 0.370). This result provides evidence that in scenario 1 and scenario 2 there is 
some preference for cancer outcomes, as these estimates are significantly different from 1.00 
(representing no preference for cancer outcomes). It is important to note, the median 
preference estimate does not capture the distribution of preferences, only the most common 
answer.  
 
The null hypothesis of the Wilcoxon one-sample signed-rank test is based on rankings; 
therefore, it is possible to produce a statistically significant result even if the observed 
median preference weight is equal to that of the null hypothesis of 1.00 (no preference). The 
Wilcoxon signed-rank test takes the difference between each observed data point and the 
theoretical median, and then ranks these differences from smallest to largest to compute a test 
statistic. This significant result is due to the fact that the distribution of the ranking scores 
may differ.  
 
Table 7: Mean and Median Preference Weights by Scenario. 
 Mean Median Wilcoxon Test of Medians  
(h0 = 1.00)  
Scenario 1                              1.14 1.00 z = 5.318; p < 0.001 
Scenario 2 1.05 1.00 z = -0.897; p = 0.370 
Scenario 3 1.20 1.00 z = 5.526; p < 0.001 
The Wilcoxon signed-rank test was used to test for a significant difference between the observed median 
preference weight and the null hypothesis of 1.00 (representing no preference for cancer outcomes). This test 
was performed for each scenario separately. A significant result is denoted as p < 0.001.  
 
5.1.4  Probit Models 
Table 8 displays ordered probit models of the four main response categories. The categories 
are ordered from least to most egalitarian (i.e., pro-non-cancer, health maximizer, weighted 




priority to cancer patients for resource allocation. Standard errors are presented in 
parentheses. There were no statistically significant results in the respondent covariates across 
all scenarios. Figure 6 shows the marginal effects for each response category between two 
scenarios visually. The marginal effects graph demonstrates how the response categories 
change when the scenario switches. The most notable changes in response categories are 
revealed in comparisons involving scenario 2. Specifically, switching from scenario 2 to 
scenario 1 leads to an increase in weighted prioritarians and a decrease in health maximizers.  
Similarly, switching from scenario 3 to scenario 2 results in an increase in health maximizers 
and a decrease in weighted prioritarians.  
 
Table 8: Ordered Probit Model of Response Categories. 






Intercept 1 (Health Maximizer) 
Intercept 2 (Weighted Prioritarian) 





Age (18 to 24 years) 
25 to 39 years 
40+ years 
 
Income (Less than $30,000) 
$30,000-$69,000 
$70,000-$100,000 
Greater than $100,000 
 
Education (High school graduate) 




Healthcare worker (No) 
Yes 
 
Relationship to cancer patients (None) 
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Note: A positive coefficient indicates a difference towards greater priority to cancer therapy. 






Figure 6: Marginal Effects on Probabilities from, Ordered Probit Model with Covariates. 
Note: scenario 1 focused on all cancer patients versus patients with severe non-cancer conditions at an 
individual level; scenario 2 focused on lung cancer patients versus heart failure patients at an individual level; 
scenario 3 focused on lung cancer prevention versus diabetes prevention at a population level. 
Table 9 presents the probit model of combined response categories (pro-non-cancer + health 
maximizer versus weighted prioritarian + strong prioritarian). The least egalitarian group was 
used as the reference group (pro-non-cancer + health maximizer). These categories were 
combined as we are interested in the factors that influence someone to associate greater 
priority to cancer. Respondents who were categorized as weighted and strong prioritarians 
chose to fund cancer therapies even when option B became inefficient. Pro-non-cancer and 
health maximizers chose to fund non-cancer therapies when option B became inefficient.  
 
There were also no statistically significant results here. Across all three scenarios, the 
intercepts were negative, meaning respondents tended to prioritize non-cancer conditions. 




type is a health maximizer, regardless of the scenario. This result is robust to demographic 
characteristics like income, education, gender, and age. “Relationship to cancer patients” did 
not influence the respondent’s choices, and neither did “healthcare worker.”
Table 9: Probit Model of Combined Response Categories. 
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Note: A positive coefficient indicates a difference towards greater priority to cancer therapy. 
* p < 0.05 
1 = The model automatically dropped six observations. 
 
 
5.1.5  Individual Level Preferences Across the Three Scenarios  
Figure 7 shows the individual switching points for each scenario. Each circle in the graph 
represents a participant. The horizontal axis represents their indifference or switching point 
for a given scenario (e.g., scenario 1), and the vertical axis represents their indifference point 
for the next scenario (e.g., scenario 2). The stronger the preference for allocation to cancer 
treatment, the later a respondent would switch, with <5 representing the greatest preference. 
Here, we can visually see the point where a respondent decides to switch options in one 




represents the same trade-off point between scenarios, i.e., a participant would be on this line 
if they had the same trade-off point for both scenarios under comparison. 
 
For the graph comparing scenario 1 vs. scenario 2, many individuals who were weighted or 
strong prioritarians in scenario 1 switched to pro-non-cancer and health maximizers in 
scenario 2. This is apparent by the cluster of points in the lower half of the graph. However, 
many individuals remained health maximizers in both scenarios, which can be seen by the 
multiple markers present on the redline at point (10,10).  There seems to be more variation in 
the graph comparing scenario 1 vs. scenario 3, relative to the previous example. Many 
individuals who were health maximizers in scenario 1 became weighted and strong 
prioritarians in scenario 3. This is apparent by the number of markers above the red line at 
point 10 on the x-axis. Additionally, respondents who were prioritarians in scenario 1 tended 
to switch even later in scenario 3, thus, strengthening their preferences for cancer conditions. 
Overall, there was an increase in prioritarians from scenario 1 to scenario 3. A similar effect 
can be seen on the graph comparing scenario 2 vs. scenario 3. The majority of individuals 
who were health-maximizers (and pro-non-cancer) in scenario 2 converted to weighted and 














Figure 7: Comparison of Indifference Points between Scenarios. 
 
5.1.6  Switching Response Categories Across Scenarios 
Table 10 presents the probability of changing response categories across scenarios. While 
using the response categories from the reference scenario (row), probabilities were then 
calculated for the scenario of interest (column). For example, if a respondent was pro-non-
cancer in scenario 1, they have a 2.5% chance of becoming a weighted prioritarian in 
scenario 2. 
 
These results are similar to those presented in Figure 7. For instance, we saw a large portion 
of health maximizers in scenario 2 who switched to weighted and strong prioritarians in 
scenario 3. Referencing table 10, the probability of a health maximizer in scenario 2, 
converting to a weighted and strong prioritarian in scenario 3, is 78.8% and 73.6%, 




strong prioritarian in scenario 2 is 99.9%. Consequently, the probability of a pro-non-cancer, 
health maximizer, and weighted prioritarian in scenario 1 becoming a strong prioritarian in 
scenario 2 is 0%. Since scenario 2 focused on two equally as severe conditions (lung cancer 
and heart failure), it is unlikely that the respondents in scenario 1 who were categorized as 
pro-non-cancer and health maximizer would switch to favouring lung cancer in scenario 2 
when they prioritized general non-cancer conditions previously. Overall, pro-non-cancer and 
health maximizers were generally the same groups of individuals, whereas weighted 
prioritarians and strong prioritarians were the same groups of individuals. There was, 
however, some cross-over for health maximizers between categories. 
 
Table 10: Probability of Changing Response Categories across Scenario. 
       Scenario 1 (Reference) 








Pro-non-cancer 9.0% 64.6% 24.2% 2.2% 
Health Maximizer 12.8% 67.0% 18.9% 1.3% 
Weighted Prioritarian 2.5% 48.0% 41.5% 8.0% 
Strong Prioritarian 0% 0% 0% 99.9% 
     









Pro-non-cancer 11.9% 68.0% 18.6% 1.5% 
Health Maximizer 14.6% 68.6% 15.7% 1.1% 
Weighted Prioritarian 3.4% 54.3% 35.7% 6.5% 
Strong Prioritarian 0.2% 19.5% 48.3% 32.0% 
     









Pro-non-cancer 44.8% 54.3% 0.8% 0.1% 
Health Maximizer 12.5% 78.7% 7.5% 1.3% 
Weighted Prioritarian 9.5% 78.8% 9.8% 1.9% 
Strong Prioritarian 4.1% 73.6% 17.3% 5.0% 
     












Pro-non-cancer 30.2% 67.2% 2.4% 0.2% 
Health Maximizer 13.1% 77.7% 7.9% 1.3% 
Weighted Prioritarian 12.8% 77.8% 8.1% 1.3% 
Strong Prioritarian  0.9% 52.3% 30.6% 16.2% 
 
5.2  Qualitative Data 
At the end of each scenario, respondents had the opportunity to explain their reasoning on 
why they chose the option they did. Many themes were common across scenarios and 
response categories. For pro-non-cancer respondents, one of the most common themes was 
disease severity. Many of these respondents mentioned that cancer is just as severe as non-
cancer conditions and that increasing the lifespan of a non-cancer patient would be easier 
than a cancer patient. Additionally, they believed that it would be more beneficial to relieve 
cancer patients from their pain and suffering as it is such a burdensome disease. They 
continued to explain that these resources would be put to better use treating a disease that is 
curable or at least one with better health outcomes. Another common theme was the fact that 
cancer has many charities dedicated to its research and, thus, adequate awareness. They 
stated that other diseases deserve the same attention. Regarding scenario 2 specifically, many 
respondents commented on how lung cancer is lifestyle-related or self-inflicted; thus, these 
patients should receive less priority. In scenario 3, pro-non-cancer respondents stated that 
more children are affected by diabetes which is why it should receive priority compared to 
lung cancer.  
 
Health maximizers exhibited typical themes that are present in most healthcare resource 
allocation decisions. The majority of respondents’ comments included some sort of rationale 
on cost-effectiveness, such as maximizing life expectancy, treating the largest number of 
people, or treating the ones who can benefit the most. Many health maximizers also 
commented that everyone should be treated equally regardless of their disease status. 
Respondents who were considered weighted or strong prioritarians gravitated towards 
emotionally based themes. Many of these individuals commented that cancer patients have 
family responsibilities (i.e., dependents) or that treatment would increase their time spent 




not only on the individual themselves but their family as well. The majority of prioritarians 
also mentioned that cancer is incurable and fatal; thus, resources need to be directed here to 
create a long-term treatment. Regarding scenario 2 specifically, these individuals stated that 
heart failure is lifestyle-related due to poor diet and lack of exercise; thus, lung cancer should 
be prioritized. Others also mentioned that heart failure has more treatment options than lung 
cancer (such as heart transplants). In scenario 3, most of these respondents commented that 
lung cancer is more severe and lacks an effective treatment, unlike diabetes, which is 
manageable. 
 
Some participants used the open space to comment on the questionnaire itself. A few 
individuals mentioned that this questionnaire was a difficult decision morally, and they were 
glad they were not making these decisions in real life. Others stated that this questionnaire 
put “things into perspective,” and after some reflection, they wanted to change their answers. 












Table 11: Rationales Provided by Respondents. 
Response 
Category 
Common Themes Quotes 
Pro-non-cancer 
 
Scenario 1 and 2: 
- Relief from suffering  
- Poor health outcomes 
- Equal disease severity 
- Adequate funding  




- Inadequate awareness   
- Prioritize children  
 
 
- “Cancer patients are usually really sick and in pain, the last few months of their life, so why prolong their 
agony.” 
 
- “While cancer has negatively impacted my family, in my opinion, there are more public funds raised by 
charities directly impacting cancer care.  "Other diseases" as a group do not tend to receive the same 
attention and charity dollars as cancer; however, the need for financing still exists.” 
 
- “Tough decisions/questions but given the steadily declining returns of the new cancer treatment(s) in the 
presented scenarios, it only makes sense to devote more resources to the life-extending treatments for non-
cancer patients.” 
 
- “Diabetes risks are everywhere while the latter (lung cancer) are still being calculated. People no longer 
smoke on a major scale as before since the introduction of vapor technologies and marijuana. The risks are 
being calculated so there would be lower adoption. With diabetes, sugar is everywhere, even in ketchup. 





Scenario 1, 2, and 3: 
- Cost-effectiveness 
- Capacity to benefit 
- Best outcome 
- Maximize number helped 
- Treat everyone equally 
 
 
- “I felt that extending the lives of people as much as possible was more important than a specific group, 
cancer vs. non-cancer. I chose the outcome that was the highest.” 
 
- “Although there is a moral issue, the treatment should go to the ones who would benefit most.” 
 
- “I consider heart failure to be equally serious as lung cancer, and so for these series of decisions, I based 
my reasoning solely on the number of months added to the cohort's lives.” 
 
- “I was trying to optimize health gains for all patients.” 
 
- “When months gained is the only variable, it makes sense always to choose the option that provides the 





Prioritarians Scenario 1 and 2: 
- Family responsibilities  
- Uncurable/fatal 
- Physical and financial 
burden 
- Lifestyle-related  
 
Scenario 3: 
- Severity and rarity 
- Treatment availability 
 
 
- “I feel like cancer is the more devastating of the two choices of disease, so advanced therapy would 
benefit them more. However, when the benefit is close to not changing treatments (8/7 months vs. 5), it 
makes more sense to benefit the non-cancer patients.” 
 
- “Cancers are varied and a leading cause of death. There might be other options for patients with non-
cancer issues such as transplant, PT, etc., while cancers have fewer treatment options.” 
 
- “I have personal experience with loss due to cancer. Since I do not see it being cured before the other 
diseases mentioned, I believe the longer time cancer patients can have, the better.” 
 
- “I understand that people with diabetes are not always from a bad diet. I have a friend who is young and 
fit with diabetes. I feel a big portion of the disease can be prevented, so I have to lean towards lung cancer, 






6  Discussion Introduction 
This chapter will discuss the results of our systematic review and survey; here, we will 
attempt to explain the findings. This section will also list the study's strengths and limitations. 
Lastly, possible routes for future research and implications will be covered as well as the 
conclusion.  
 
6.1  Key Findings 
Our systematic review found that respondents exhibit priority weighting in resource 
allocation decisions; however, this is highly dependent on the patient groups compared. 
Across the seven studies captured, there is evidence of preference for treating younger 
patients, those facing imminent death, lower-income patients, larger groups, and those with 
the greatest initial life expectancy. Although treatment of larger groups is generally preferred, 
there is evidence of a distributional preference for larger health gains to smaller groups of 
people over smaller health gains to larger groups of people. This distributional preference is 
more pronounced when the difference in the number of health gains and people treated 
between the two options is extreme (i.e., 500 people gain 20 years of life expectancy vs. 10 
000 people gain 1 year of life expectancy). A study on orphan drugs found a preference for 
rare disease drugs over common disease drugs only when the costs were presented as equal. 
When costs were presented as unequal, the majority chose to fund the common disease drug. 
As this review did not find any literature comparing trade-offs between cancer and non-
cancer conditions in resource allocation decisions, our survey was created with the objective 
of eliciting these preferences. 
 
One of the key findings of our survey is that the majority of Canadians are health maximizers 
– these individuals believe that resources should be spent most efficiently by maximizing the 
number of health gains. This result is robust to disease type, healthcare intervention 




the respondents were willing to sacrifice some level of efficiency to prioritize cancer patients. 
Many previous international studies have found that the majority of the population is willing 
to sacrifice a considerable amount of total health gains in favour of reducing health 
disparities [1], [80]–[82]. If our survey provided statistics of the life expectancies of the 
cancers mentioned (i.e., showcasing the disparities in cancer versus non-cancer survival), the 
survey might have produced different results, possibly in favour of prioritarianism. 
Regardless, many respondents were still considered prioritarians in scenarios 1 and 3 (29% 
and 26%, respectively) – however, in scenario 2, when two fatal diseases were compared, the 
proportion of prioritarians decreased to 10%. This result suggests that the association of 
cancer with fatality may drive some respondents to a prioritarian response.  
 
This result can also be seen in our primary outcome, the mean preference weights. In 
scenario 1, respondents valued cancer patients 1.14 times that of non-cancer patients, 
whereas, in scenario 3, cancer patients were valued 1.20 times more. Both these results were 
statistically significant, implying there is an underlying preference for cancer patients. 
However, when comparing these values to the median preference estimates of 1.00 (for all 
scenarios); this difference between the mean and the median suggests that the respondents 
who did prioritize cancer conditions likely had a strong preference for the trade-off, i.e., these 
participants chose later trade-off points thus, skewing the mean towards a more prioritarian 
direction. However, this was not the case with scenario 2, which had the largest proportion of 
pro-non-cancer respondents. As previously mentioned, this is most likely because lung 
cancer may be seen as self-inflicted [63]. Although the same can be said about heart failure, 
it is possible that the public associates smoking with worse health outcomes than a bad diet 
[83]. One respondent commented on this issue that the general public is highly aware of the 
effects of smoking due to the abundance of anti-smoking campaigns. However, many 
individuals do not understand the influence a bad diet can have on developing heart disease. 
Interestingly, a new study on non-communicable diseases provided evidence that a poor diet 
has worse effects than smoking on morbidity and mortality [84]. 
 
Out of all the scenarios, scenario 3 had the strongest preference for cancer conditions. This 
may be since lung cancer is considered more severe than diabetes due to the lack of effective 




maximization to prioritize severe illnesses [59]. However, some respondents in this scenario 
prioritized diabetes on the basis that more children are affected by this disease. This rationale 
is consistent with previous literature, as it has been shown that the general public is generally 
more averse to disparities in life expectancy at birth (children are born with type 1 diabetes) 
and prioritizes funding children over adults [1], [3], [43]. 
 
In the probit regressions, no demographic characteristics (i.e., age, gender, income, 
education, etc.) were associated with a particular response category. We hypothesized those 
who have a personal relationship with cancer patients would be willing to sacrifice a 
considerable amount of total health gains to diminish disparities in cancer conditions; 
however, we did not find such association. However, a few respondents in the optional 
discussion box mentioned how they were personally affected by cancer, so they felt inclined 
to choose cancer conditions regardless of the inefficiencies.    
 
6.3  Discussion  
Our study suggests that Canadian preferences involving trade-offs between cancer and non-
cancer health outcomes align with the principle of health maximization. However, it is 
apparent that some respondents view cancer as “special” and deserving prioritization since 
prioritarians initially chose to fund cancer therapies when conditions were set as equal. Our 
survey intentionally avoided providing information that may bias a respondent to prefer 
cancer therapies, such as their life expectancy or survival rate. Yet, many respondents found 
it necessary to advocate for cancer therapies. These results are similar to those found in a 
cancer systematic review performed in the UK. Morrell et al. discovered that most 
respondents view cancer as “special;” however, the results were inconsistent when the 
opportunity cost of that choice was presented [85]. The same could be said for our study, 
where most respondents desired to prioritize cancer therapies; however, the results varied as 
soon as the treatment became inefficient.  
 
One Canadian study included in our review used cancer patients as their hypothetical survey 
populations; however, it assessed societal preferences involving trade-offs in age, disease 




populations. This study found a significant preference for prioritizing younger and larger 
cancer patient groups and cancer patients with the greatest initial life expectancy. As these 
results are not directly comparable to our survey and there are no Canadian studies 
comparing cancer and non-cancer trade-offs, we looked at the results of existing studies that 
involved orphan drug trade-offs. Although cancer is considered a common disease, the cost 
of cancer treatment can be comparable to that of an orphan drug. Therefore, we can discuss 
and compare our results to a Canadian and Norwegian study on orphan drugs. These studies 
found that most participants were indifferent between rare and common disease drugs when 
costs were presented as equal. This result is similar to our survey, as most individuals were 
health maximizers (i.e., indifferent) when health gains were equal [2], [48]. However, when 
there was no option for indifference, the majority of participants chose rare diseases. 
Similarly, when the costs of rare diseases were presented as four times the amount of 
common diseases, only 7% of individuals chose rare diseases [54]. This value can be 
compared to our percentage of strong prioritarians. Although our cancer health gains were 
two times less than non-cancer health gains in the last pair, 3-7% chose cancer conditions. 
 
Our study hypothesized that there would be some degree of preference for cancer patients as 
the implied thresholds used by CADTH and NICE indicate that cancer treatment should be 
prioritized over other diseases [31], [38]. Additionally, in the UK, the Cancer Drugs Fund 
assumes a societal preference to fund cancer care relative to other conditions, even if this 
results in a lower health gain to the population overall [86]. Based on an international 
systematic review involving cancer trade-offs, it seems that individuals want to help cancer 
patients; however, they are not willing to do this at the expense of other patients (or total 
population health) [85]. Overall, this review, as well as our survey, did not find consistent 
support for a preference for health gains to cancer patients in resource allocation decisions. 
Therefore, the increased WTP threshold used for cancer and rare diseases may need to be re-
evaluated.  
 
However, it is important to note our survey was intentionally designed to be simple, so we do 
not cognitively burden respondents. Therefore, it does not cover all aspects of decision-
making processes. For instance, cancer and non-cancer conditions also have an age 




that is simple enough for the general public to comprehend but at the same time provides the 
range of reimbursements options that are available to policy makers during these decisions. 
This is also the case when attempting to incorporate multiple aspects of a disease and its 
treatment options into a questionnaire (i.e., life expectancy with and without treatment, age 
group, alternative medicines, etc.). For these reasons, the preference weights we obtained are 
estimates and should be treated as a general benchmark in priority weighting reimbursement 
decisions.  
 
Similarly, the WTP threshold should also be used as a guideline rather than an explicit 
decision-making rule. Cost-effectiveness models are a tool that can aid policy makers in 
determining an estimate of what the most cost-effective option is, however, this is not a 
definite answer – there is a lot of uncertainty surrounding WTP thresholds and ICERs. These 
models do not consider other complexities that policy makers must account for, such as 
disease pathways, public concerns around health equity, baseline distribution of health, and 
societal costs and outcomes. As there is no straightforward solution, policy makers do their 
best to make well-informed allocation decisions however, there will be times when 
objections from the public arise. Many of these public outcry’s reflect preferences of the 
society which are not explicitly incorporated in decision-making processes. These times are 
crucial for policy makers to re-evaluate whether their original decision aligned with public 
preferences and how to move forward while considering their fixed budget. Overall, 
healthcare reimbursement decisions are a complex issue that requires input from multiple 
perspectives, however, each estimate – whether it be a preference weight, or a cost-
effectiveness ratio, needs to be considered with skepticism.  
 
6.4  Strengths and Limitations  
This thesis makes several contributions to the literature. Firstly, to our knowledge, this is the 
first systematic review to collectively pool together Canadian evidence on public preferences 
in relation to trade-offs involved in resource allocation between health conditions and 
sociodemographic groups. In our review, we found that the Canadian population is largely 
averse to disparities concerning income and health; however, the extent of their priority 




elicit Canadian preferences on cancer versus non-cancer resource allocation decisions. 
Priority weighting is present; however, the magnitude depends on the scenarios used to elicit 
trade-offs. In contrast to the majority of Canadian studies, we also assessed the effect of 
potential covariates such as sociodemographic factors. Thirdly, our research was the first 
Canadian study to provide preference weights as well as present the distribution of response 
patterns comparing cancer health outcomes against non-cancer health outcomes. There is 
currently a lack of Canadian literature on trade-off decisions, specifically regarding cancer 
therapies. This research will pave the way to utilizing this information in real-life decision-
making. 
 
One limitation of the study relates to the implementation of the survey only; specifically, the 
survey did not allow participants to go back and change their responses. Some respondents 
provided commentary that they would have liked to change their answer after some 
reflection, while others did not realize the decision that was at play until after a few 
questions. This addition would also benefit respondents who might have misclicked their 
answers, and therefore, were removed from the analysis as a logically inconsistent answer. 
The lack of this option may have exposed our questionnaire to response bias. A second 
limitation is due to the fact that the questionnaire had a fixed order of presentation for the 
scenarios; therefore, we could not control for the potential effects of order. A final limitation 
of the study is that participants could advance through the questionnaire without answering 
demographic questions. In the previous sections, the programming of the survey did not 
permit participants to leave any of the trade-off questions unanswered as complete data was 
necessary to calculate preferences. Due to the programming in the demographic section, 
about 15 observations were dropped in the covariate analysis as they were left unanswered. 
 
6.5  Future Research 
As our systematic review has shown, only seven studies involving societal preferences and 
priority weighting have been conducted in Canada. There are currently conflicting views on 
how healthcare budgets should be spent, and thus, future research must further investigate 
Canadians' preferences on allocation decisions. Future studies should focus on eliciting 




includes ethnicity groups (i.e., Indigenous patients), geographic locations (i.e., rural vs. 
urban), and protected groups (i.e., people with disabilities). The use of different frameworks 
would also be beneficial to assess it’s effect on preference elicitation (i.e., presenting gains in 
QALYs or burden of illness, varying opportunity costs, etc.). To directly extend our survey, 
one could perform an experimental study comparing the effects of displaying the baseline 
age distribution and expected survival of cancer on allocation preferences. 
  
6.6  Conclusion 
This thesis aimed to assess Canadians' preferences concerning trade-offs involving health 
conditions and sociodemographic groups by first performing a systematic review of the 
available evidence and then by performing our own research eliciting allocation preferences 
for cancer versus non-cancer therapies. Overall, we established that most Canadians prefer to 
allocate resources based on the principle of health maximization, irrespective of the disease; 
however, a smaller proportion of respondents were willing to sacrifice a portion of efficiency 
to prioritize certain patient groups. When the hypothetical scenario presented two equally as 
severe diseases, there was a minimal preference for cancer therapies. However, when the 
scenario was worded broadly to group multiple cancers against multiple non-cancer 
conditions, there was a greater priority for cancer therapies. The underlying attribute on 
which respondents base their choice may be disease severity. In the last scenario, there was a 
significantly greater preference for lung cancer prevention relative to diabetes prevention – 
which can be argued as a less severe disease. The direct preference weights derived in our 
study indicate some degree of preference for cancer therapies; however, the median 
respondents did not seem to support giving priority to cancer over non-cancer conditions. In 
practice, there is a fixed budget, and money must be relocated to accommodate such changes 
(i.e., increasing the WTP threshold). 
  
This study also analyzed the effect of demographic covariates; however, there was no 
association between these factors and a specific response type. Future research should aim to 
explore and analyze new covariates such as familiarity with the disease, parenthood (i.e., one 
or more children), location (i.e., province or region), marital status, etc. Since our study did 




allocation decisions, policy makers should consider re-evaluating the WTP thresholds used to 
examine cancer interventions. However, our results may not have fully captured the full 
range of the public’s preferences for cancer-drug policy. Future research should consider 
familiarizing Canadians with the cancer-drug issue by incorporating an educational 
component before eliciting the public’s preferences. Additionally, the use of different 
frameworks, opportunity costs, and policy options should be used to describe the policy 
challenges posed by expensive cancer treatment. Many scholars pose the risk of informing 
policy makers with inaccurate preferences estimates as the studies do not present the full 
range of resource allocation options available to decision makers, i.e., increasing taxes, 
reallocating funds, etc. [2]. The greater variety in study designs will allow citizens to 
understand the process of reimbursement decision-making institutions themselves and 
provide stable preference estimates. As studies in this domain increase, societal preferences 
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Appendix A: Search Terms. 





















1. (Health or QALY or Quality Adjusted Life Year* or moral).ti,ab. 
2. (inequit* or equit* or equalit* or inequalit* or egalitar* or equal* or differential or unfair* or fair* 
or diverge* or moral or health gain* or survival gain*).ti,ab. 
3. (respondent* or sampl* or participant* or subject or electoral register or electoral roll).ti,ab. 
4. (study or studies or survey* or experiment* or elicit* or empirical* or DCE or person trade-off or 
PTO or preference* or weight* or reason*).ti,ab. 
5. 4 or 3 
6. 1 and 2 and 5  
7. (Social Welfare Function* or SWF).ti,ab. 
8. (public preference* OR community preference* or societal preference*).ti,ab. 
9. (relative value* or social value* or societal value* or community value*).ti,ab. 
10. ((distribution* adj weight*) or equity weight* or lifetime health or (QALY adj2 weight*) or 
(equity adj2 preference*) or (QALY and relative value)).ti,ab. 
11. ((distribut* adj2 preference*) or distribut* criteria).ti,ab. 
12. (rationing guideline* or prioritisation criteria or prioritization criteria or healthcare priorities).ti,ab. 
13. (fair-innings or ageism or age-related weights or age-weighting preferences).ti,ab. 
14. ((health adj maximi*) or health benefit maximi*).ti,ab. 
15. Health Inequality Aversion.ti,ab. 
16. 7 or 8 or 9 or 10 or 11 or 12 or 13 or 14 or 15 


















S1. AB (Health or QALY or Quality Adjusted Life Year* or moral) 
OR  
TI (Health or QALY or Quality Adjusted Life Year* or moral)  
 
S2. AB (inequit* or equit* or equalit* or inequalit* or egalitar* or equal* or differential or unfair* or 
fair* or diverge* or moral or health gain* or survival gain*) 
OR 
TI (inequit* or equit* or equalit* or inequalit* or egalitar* or equal* or differential or unfair* or fair* 
or diverge* or moral or health gain* or survival gain*) 
 
S3. AB (respondent* or sampl* or participant* or subject* or electoral register or electoral roll)  
OR 
TI (respondent* or sampl* or participant* or subject* or electoral register or electoral roll)  
 
S4. AB (study or studies or survey* or experiment* or elicit* or empirical* or DCE or person trade-off 
or PTO or preference* or weight* or reason*)  
OR 
TI (study or studies or survey* or experiment* or elicit* or empirical* or DCE or person trade-off or 
PTO or preference* or weight* or reason*)  
 
S5. S3 OR S4 
S6. S1 AND S2 AND S5 
 
S7. AB (relative value* or social value* or societal value* or community value*) 
OR 
TI (relative value* or social value* or societal value* or community value*) 
 
S8. AB (public preference* or community preference* or societal preference*) 
OR  
TI (public preference* or community preference* or societal preference*) 
 
S9. AB ((distribut* N2 preference*) or distribut* criteria) 
OR 
TI ((distribut* N2 preference*) or distribut* criteria) 
 
S10. AB ((distribution* N0 weight*) or equity weight* or lifetime health or (QALY N2 weight*) or 
(equity N2 preference*) or (QALY and relative value))  
OR 
TI ((distribution* N0 weight*) or equity weight* or lifetime health or (QALY N2 weight*) or (equity 
N2 preference*) or (QALY and relative value)) 
 
S11. AB ((health N0 maximi*) or health benefit maximi*) 
OR 
TI ((health N0 maximi*) or health benefit maximi*) 
 
S12. AB (Social Welfare Function* or SWF) 
OR 
TI (Social Welfare Function* or SWF) 
 
S13. AB (fair-innings or ageism or age-related weights or age-weighting preferences) 
OR 
TI (fair-innings or ageism or age-related weights or age-weighting preferences) 
 
S14. S7 OR S8 OR S9 OR S10 OR S11 OR S12 OR S13  





Appendix B: Risk of Bias Assessment. 
 
Authors (date) Population representatives  Response rate 
adequacy 
Missing data Reliability and validity of the survey 
instrument 
Hurley et al. 
(2020) 
Medium – the average age of the sample is 
60 years old which is a bit older than the 
general Canadian population. 
 
Low – the response 
rate was 11.6%. 
Low – 8% of the sample did not 
complete the entire survey. 
High – survey was pilot-tested prior to 
the main study.  
Johri et al. (2008) High – large, national sample which 
mirrored the Canadian population with 
respect to age and gender. 
Low – of those 
contacted, 8% 
responded to the 
survey. 
Medium 1– Only 79% of people who 
responded by clicking on the survey 
finished the baseline survey and were 
invited to complete the follow up, and 
only 62% of them completed the 
follow-up 7 weeks later. 
 
Not reported. 
Choudhry et al. 
(1997) 
Low – the population is more educated 
and older than the general Canadian 
population. 
 
Medium – 61% of 
participants provided 
usable answers. 
High – 32% participants did not 
respond at all. 
Not reported. 
Denburg et al. 
(2020) 
High – population sample was compared 
to Canadian Statistics. 




High – 38% were excluded for 
incomplete survey. 
High – Iterative refinements to the 
survey were informed by a pilot phase 
with experts (n = 3), laypersons (n = 2) 
and field testing with members of the 
public (n = 32). 
 
Stafinski et al. 
(2017) 
High – population sample was compared 
to Canadian Statistics. 
Not reported. Low – discussion survey was 
completed by all participants.  
High – the discussion choices used in 
the survey were based off a previous 
study. 
 
Skedgel et al. 
(2014) 
High – population sample was compared 
to Canadian Statistics. 
Not reported. Low – the survey completion rate was 
85%. 
Medium – comprehensive reviews were 
performed to identify important 
concepts and empirical and ethical 
filters within the survey. 
 
Dragojlovic et al. 
(2015) 
High – large, national sample which 
mirrored the Canadian population with 
respect to age and gender. 
Not reported. Not reported. High – survey was a modified version 












































































































































Appendix D: Number of Participants in Each Response Category 






Scenario 1          Pro-non-cancer 
                            Health maximizer 
                            Weighted prioritarian 














Scenario 2          Pro-non-cancer 
                            Health maximizer 
                            Weighted prioritarian 
                            Strong prioritarian 
 















Scenario 3          Pro-non-cancer 
                            Health maximizer 
                            Weighted prioritarian 
                            Strong prioritarian 
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